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How will artificial intelligence (AI) transform government? Stemming from a 
major study commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS), we highlight the promise and trajectory of algorithmic tools 
used by federal agencies to perform the work of governance. Moving past the 
abstract mappings of transparency measures and regulatory mechanisms that 
pervade the current algorithmic accountability literature, our analysis centers 
around a detailed technical account of a pair of current applications that 
exemplify AI’s move to the center of the redistributive and coercive power of 
the state: the Social Security Administration’s use of AI tools to adjudicate 
disability benefits cases and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of 
AI tools to target enforcement efforts under federal securities law. We argue 
that the next generation of work will need to push past a narrow focus on 
constitutional law and instead engage with the broader terrain of 
administrative law, which is far more likely to modulate use of algorithmic 
governance tools going forward. We demonstrate the shortcomings of 
conventional ex ante and ex post review under current administrative law 
doctrines and then consider how those doctrines might adapt in response. 
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Finally, we ask how else to build a sensible accountability structure around 
public sector use of algorithmic governance tools while maintaining incentives 
and opportunities for salutary innovation. Reviewing some commonly offered 
solutions, we propose a further and novel approach to oversight centered on 
prospective benchmarking. By requiring agencies to reserve a random set of 
cases for manual decision making, benchmarking offers a concrete and 
accessible test of the validity and legality of machine outputs, enabling 
agencies, courts, and the public to learn about, validate, and correct errors in 
algorithmic decision making. 
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In 2018, IBM published a white paper touting artificial intelligence (AI) 
as a way to “reinvent[] the business of government.”1 With IBM’s help, the 
paper proclaimed, governments will undergo a digital transformation, become 
more client-oriented, and “recognize each citizen as a whole individual, with a 
personalized set of needs, interests, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.”2 The new 
suite of AI-based tools, it continued, will “[i]mprove the decision making of 
civil servants for maximum impact,”3 empowering agency administrators to 
“apply digital insights to predict and intervene for better citizen outcomes.”4 
“[D]igital reinvention,” came a final claim, will not just yield a government that 
is more responsive and effective in performing its duties and meeting citizen 
needs,5 but also one that operates with “[g]reater transparency.”6 
The tenor of IBM’s claims should have a familiar ring. Twenty-five years 
earlier, President Clinton made comparable promises to “reinvent . . . 
[g]overnment.”7 Speaking near a Sunnyvale community center in Silicon 
Valley, Clinton and Vice President Gore lauded the city as a model for 
reinvention.8 Sunnyvale captured data on thousands of measures, developed 
targets for each governmental unit, and instituted performance-based pay and 
budgeting. As described by Osborne and Gaebler in their bestselling book 
Reinventing Government, Sunnyvale was “the performance leader,”9 
transforming government into a lean, responsive, customer-oriented business.10 
Per the New York Times, “If the Clinton Administration has its way, all of 
America will operate like this highly computerized, relentlessly self-evaluating 
city in the heart of Silicon Valley.”11 The new digital toolkit would also enable 
government to “empower citizens to shape the marketplace according to their 
 
1.  IBM, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: REINVENTING THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 
(2018).  
2.  Id. at 13.  
3.  Id. at 5. 
4.  Id. at 13.  
5.  Id. at 5.  
6.  Id. at 7. 
7.  President Bill Clinton, Remarks by President Clinton Announcing the Initiative to 
Streamline Government (Mar. 3, 1993), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/speeches/030393.html 
[https://perma.cc/C6SR-MTX3]. 
8.  Paul Richter, Clinton, Gore Hail Sunnyvale’s City Efficiency, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 
1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-11-mn-34070-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/K6Z2-96GP].  
9.  DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 142 (1992).  
10.  See id. at 145.  
11.  Seth Mydans, Where Trouble Is Rare and Governing Is Easy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
10, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/10/us/where-trouble-is-rare-and-governing-is-easy.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GAV-4PXP].  
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own needs and values”12 and, as Gore put it, “earn back the trust of 
Americans.”13 
Yet Sunnyvale floundered. When its performance index dropped, it 
changed the weights. When new weights did not fix matters, it abandoned the 
overall measure. By 1999, employees quit in droves and accused municipal 
leadership of mismanagement.14 So went the beacon of public sector 
performance measurement and a newly responsive approach to government. 
When agency administrators can define and game performance measures and 
lack clear baselines for judging gains from technology adoptions, new systems 
can erode accountability and foil oversight rather than promote regulatory 
goals.15 
What should we make of the new calls to reinvent government, this time 
using AI?16 Can AI make good on a twenty-five-year-old promise to remake 
governance through technology? Will it, as IBM and many others suggest, 
yield a more nimble, responsive, and transparent public sector? Or will the new 
algorithmic governance tools fall prey to Sunnyvale’s trap of promising a silver 
technology bullet? Worse, might AI tools erode, rather than promote, internal 
efficacy and external accountability, or even spark the same demoralized 
exodus from government as Sunnyvale’s ill-fated experiment? And how might 
law manage these opportunities and risks? 
In 2019, we led a unique, interdisciplinary team of three dozen lawyers 
and computer scientists to deliver a far-ranging report to the Chair of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) on the use of AI by 
 
12.  OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 9, at 306.  
13.  OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS 
BETTER & COSTS LESS: STATUS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 14 (1994).  
14.  Kelly Wilkinson, Trouble in Paradise: Sunnyvale Is Nationally Recognized for Its 
Stable City Government. Now Employees Are Leaving En Masse, SUNNYVALE SUN (Aug. 4, 1999) 
(“During the past five years, the city’s employee turnover rates have nearly doubled, even though 
retirement rates have barely budged a percentage point.”).  
15.  Daniel E. Ho, Cassandra Handan-Nader, David Ames & David Marcus, Quality 
Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized Natural Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 
2003-16, 35 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 239 (2019); Daniel E. Ho & Sam Sherman, Managing Street-Level 
Arbitrariness: The Evidence Base for Public Sector Quality Improvement, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
251 (2017); see also John Buntin, 25 Years Later, What Happened to ‘Reinventing Government’?, 
GOVERNING (Sept. 2016), https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-reinventing-government-
book.html [https://perma.cc/XBG3-9RD5] (noting tendency of performance management systems to 
ossify and encourage agencies to “post good numbers” rather than develop innovative solutions to 
problems). 
16.  To be fair, IBM is hardly alone in its faith in a digitized revolution in the work of 
government. See, e.g., Anusha Dhasarthy, Sahil Jain & Naufal Khan, When Governments Turn to AI: 
Algorithms, Trade-Offs, and Trust, MCKINSEY (2019); William D. Eggers, David Schatsky & Peter 
Viechnicki, AI-Augmented Government: Using Cognitive Technologies to Redesign Public Sector Work, 
DELOITTE (2017); Max Stier & Daniel Chenok, The Future Has Begun: Using Artificial Intelligence to 
Transform Government, IBM CENTER FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T (2018); Franco Amalfi, Building 
Government for the 21st Century, ORACLE (2018); Hila Mehr, Artificial Intelligence for Citizen Services 
and Government, HARVARD ASH CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION (2017); 
Miguel Carrasco et al., The Citizen’s Perspective on the Use of AI in Government, BCG (2019). 
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federal regulatory agencies.17 We canvassed the roughly 140 most important 
federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies for evidence of adoption of AI 
and machine learning and conducted in-depth case studies, relying on extensive 
interviews and documentation, to unearth some of the most innovative uses of 
AI for core government functions. 
Our research brings to light a wide catalog of algorithmic governance 
tools, thus confirming AI’s extraordinary potential to reimagine core agency 
functions across the full range of agency processes and outputs, from 
enforcement and adjudication to citizen engagement and procurement. The 
project likewise confirms that the proliferation of new algorithmic governance 
tools throughout the administrative state will shift, perhaps substantially, the 
subtle balance among technical efficiency, democratic accountability, and 
regularity at the heart of sound administrative governance. Perhaps most 
significant of all, our project points up the poverty of existing thinking about 
how to build a sensible accountability structure around the new algorithmic 
governance. Most of the scholarly literature remains untethered from the actual 
state of technology, offering “thought experiments,”18 focusing on potential 
rather than actual applications,19 or abstracting away from any concrete 
applications at all.20 Moreover, by fixating on a small set of criminal justice 
 
17.  See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & 
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSF5-TF2Q] [hereinafter 
GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM]. 
18.  Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1137 (2019). 
19.  See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-
by-Data on Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2019) (considering use of data and AI to craft 
“personalized law”—for instance, a speed limit for each driver). 
20.  See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1258 (2008) (offering a “new framework for administrative and constitutional law designed 
to address the challenges of the automated administrative state” but abstracting from use cases save 
occasional references to no-fly lists and state-level social welfare benefit eligibility determinations); 
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 29 
(2019) [hereinafter Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency] (offering a “general analysis” of conceptions of 
transparency in the context of algorithmic governance, but rooting the analysis almost entirely in 
potential uses of algorithmic tools by, among others, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making 
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017) [hereinafter Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by 
Robot] (focusing mostly on potential uses of algorithmic governance tools by the U.S. Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
among others, and making no effort to isolate and examine specific existing use cases). The one 
exception is a growing literature on use of algorithmic “risk assessment” tools to assist bail, sentencing, 
and parole decisions within the criminal justice system. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive 
Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705 (2016); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal 
Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); 
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017); Joel Tito, 
Destination Unknown: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Government, CTR. FOR PUB. 
IMPACT (2017), https://resources.centreforpublicimpact.org/production/2017/09/Destination-Unknown-
AI-and-government.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYJ5-33NN] (exploring criminal justice use cases only). 
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applications and commingling public and private sector use of AI despite their 
very different characteristics and imperatives, the existing literature operates at 
a high level of abstraction and, perhaps of necessity, focuses narrowly on 
constitutional principles, particularly procedural due process and equal 
protection.21 Only a trickle of research treats the more fine-grained statutory 
requirements of administrative law and, even then, offers mostly a surface-level 
tour of potentially applicable doctrines.22 
This Article seeks to shift debate onto a more concrete footing by offering 
a more technically informed account of the new algorithmic governance tools 
and the practical and legal challenges they raise and then advancing a novel 
proposal for their regulation. In so doing, we make three distinct contributions. 
First, we push past the abstractions of the existing literature and, drawing 
on extensive in-depth interviews and research into technical and operational 
details, offer rich descriptive insight into frontier AI applications at two federal 
agencies, highlighting their likely evolution and the key normative and 
distributive implications of their adoption. A trio of tools in use at the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) aids in the adjudication of disability benefits, by 
(i) clustering together similar cases for more efficient and equitable disposition 
by administrative judges, (ii) identifying cases likely to be full grants, enabling 
the SSA to conserve resources required for a full hearing, and (iii) flagging 
errors in draft decisions by administrative judges, thus potentially avoiding 
costly appeals and reversals and improving decision consistency. Turning to 
agency enforcement, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is, like 
several other key enforcement agencies (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service and 
the Environmental Protection Agency), developing and deploying machine 
learning applications that help focus scarce agency investigative and 
enforcement resources on high-risk individuals and entities.23 We focus in 
 
21.  See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2016); Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, 
Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973 (2016); Citron, supra note 20; Danielle Keats Citron & 
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and 
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329–30 (2015). A more recent line of inquiry 
pushes to an even higher level of abstraction, exploring the implications of algorithmic governance tools 
for the legitimacy of the administrative state. See Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated 
Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
22.  See, e.g., Citron, supra note 20; Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE 
INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 134 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 
2017); Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot, supra note 20; Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. 
Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 773 (2019). 
23.  In what follows, we adopt a wide definition of enforcement that includes not just 
formal enforcement actions but also investigations, audits, and other forms of regulatory monitoring that 
may or may not lead to enforcement actions. For a contrary effort to distinguish monitoring and 
enforcement, see Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019). 
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particular on a set of tools that predict insider trading and also which 
investment advisors and other agency “registrants” are violating their 
obligations under the federal securities laws. Looking across adjudication and 
enforcement—both critically important governance tasks, but with very 
different logics and features—permits an analysis that is at once concrete and 
synthetic, yielding well-grounded but generalizable insights about whether, and 
how, to regulate public sector AI use. 
Second, we move beyond the existing literature’s focus on constitutional 
law and consider how administrative law will or should adapt to the shift to 
algorithmic governance. While the existing literature’s focus on constitutional 
law has yielded welcome insights,24 we argue that much, if not most, of the 
hard work of regulating the government’s new algorithmic toolkit will come 
not in the clouds of constitutional doctrine but in the statutory streets of 
administrative law. Yet administrative law’s virtual absence in academic and 
policy discussion is concerning not merely because of its likely centrality. Its 
neglect also matters because how current doctrine will resolve the most 
pressing cases is far from certain. Using adjudication and enforcement as 
examples and comparing and contrasting their legal treatment under 
administrative law, we show that current case law is unclear about whether 
algorithms used to make or support enforcement or adjudication decisions can 
be subjected to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
at all, or whether algorithms constitute legislative rules that must undergo 
notice and comment. To date, none have. This uncertainty is a problem because 
administrative law, at least in its current guise, is unlikely to translate into a 
consistent and comprehensive approach to regulating public sector AI use that 
consciously balances the imperatives of internal administration with the legal 
demands of external accountability. 
Third, we offer a novel and generalizable solution for monitoring, 
oversight, and accountability as the administrative state adopts these tools. We 
begin by spelling out some of the limitations of a pair of prescriptions. A 
minimalist option would be to retrofit the APA to enable prudent ex ante 
review of algorithmic tools through the notice and comment process or 
judicious ex post review by courts. We offer some tentative suggestions in this 
regard but also raise questions about whether front-end rulemaking and back-
end judicial review of the usual APA sort are well suited to wrestle with the 
systemic considerations relevant to AI adoption. Forcing algorithms into the 
current template of notice and comment is over-inclusive and risks retarding 
the regulatory state’s adoption of modern technology, thus exacerbating the 
public-private technology gap. At the same time, ex post judicial review of 
algorithmic governance tools and their outputs under current doctrine, where it 
can be had at all, does not address key concerns and suffers from a substantial 
mismatch in judicial capacity and the technical demands of algorithmic 
 
24.  See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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oversight. We also consider a commonly discussed but similarly limited 
solution that would look to an oversight board (e.g., an “FDA for 
algorithms”25) staffed with technologists, academics, lawyers, and agency 
representatives to monitor, investigate, and recommend adjustments to agency 
adoption and use of AI. 
We then argue that a further and promising intervention would require 
agencies to engage in what we call “prospective benchmarking.” In a nutshell, 
agency administrators would reserve and then analyze a random sample of 
decisions using the agency’s conventional, non-algorithmic approach. This 
“human alongside the loop” approach provides critical information and a 
comparison set to help smoke out when an algorithm has gone astray, when 
encoding the past may miss new trends, when an algorithm may create 
disparate impact, or when “automation bias” causes excessive deference to 
machine outputs. In the end, modernizing the administrative state will entail 
both adapting AI and crafting administrative procedures to address the mix of 
technical, distributive, and bureaucratic challenges raised by AI. 
Benchmarking, we conclude, is a promising step in that direction that deserves 
consideration and further elaboration. 
Before launching, some clarifications are in order. First, we use “artificial 
intelligence” to mean any instance where an agency deploys models to learn 
from data with the goal of prediction. AI is thus used interchangeably with 
machine learning but excludes simple process automation (e.g., a case 
management system to digitally process benefits applications) and conventional 
statistical analysis (e.g., regression with the aim of drawing a causal 
inference).26 Second, our description of AI techniques aims for the mid-level 
between the technical and abstract. Government agencies rarely publish 
technical manuals that spell out all of a tool’s machine learning methodology, 
whether because of reliance on third-party contractors to develop systems or 
understandable concern about gaming by the regulated community. By 
focusing our analysis on algorithmic governance tools developed in-house by 
agency technologists, we can provide richer insights into how the systems 
function. Finally, while our ACUS project encompassed nearly the entire 
federal administrative state,27 we limit our analysis to core adjudicatory and 
enforcement functions for expositional clarity and analytic leverage over the 
 
25.  Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017). 
26.  Note that our definition may exclude use cases that predominate in much of the 
emerging literature on algorithmic accountability in the administrative state, particularly the relatively 
simple, rule-based, “logical AI” systems adopted by many state agencies to automate public benefits 
determinations. See, e.g., Calo & Citron, supra note 21. Perhaps unsurprisingly, litigation challenging 
those tools has not centered on the opacity concerns that animate much of the algorithmic accountability 
literature but rather has leveled relatively straightforward procedural due process claims against the use 
of grossly deficient means of snail-mail notice and the imposition of draconian fines after unrealistically 
short time periods for those targeted to respond. See, e.g., Cahoo v. SAS Analytics, 912 F.3d 887 (6th 
Cir. 2019); Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2016). 
27.  As noted previously, we set aside only those domains in which little public 
information exists, such as national security. 
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challenges of public sector AI use. Similarly, while our ACUS project treats 
numerous legal, technical, and practical implications of the new algorithmic 
governance, we focus here on the twin challenges of internal administration and 
external accountability. Readers interested in AI uses supporting other 
governance tasks or who seek to understand other challenges of public sector 
AI use—from machine learning’s technical limits to adversarial learning and 
capacity building—are directed to the ACUS report itself and related work. 
Our article proceeds from here as follows. Part I provides an in-depth 
view of two leading use cases in agency adjudication and enforcement and 
spells out the trajectory and challenges of AI adoption in each. Part II considers 
administrative law’s response under existing doctrine. Part III evaluates 
prescriptive proposals, including retrofitting the APA and an oversight board, 
and then fleshes out the novel solution built around prospective benchmarking. 
A concluding part returns to Sunnyvale and offers some brief reflections on the 
promise and peril of the new algorithmic governance. 
I. The Algorithmic Trend in Adjudication and Enforcement 
This Part describes the shift to algorithmic decision making in 
adjudication and enforcement. We focus on these areas because they represent 
core areas of administrative governance, where two agencies in particular have 
engaged in considerable experimentation with AI: formal adjudication at the 
SSA and enforcement at the SEC. Our aims are three-fold. The first is to paint a 
rigorous, ground-level portrait of the tools in use at both agencies. Facts matter 
in law, and ungrounded speculation about errant “robot judges,” while vivid, do 
little to separate fact from fiction. Surfacing key technical and operational 
details of the tools in use at the SSA and SEC is a critical first step in 
understanding the substantial challenges algorithmic governance poses for 
administrative law—the subject of Part III. The second aim is to offer an 
informed prediction, based in a mix of legal and engineering judgment, about 
the likely trajectory of AI-based adjudication and enforcement tools. Third and 
finally, we aim to connect up tools in use at the SSA and SEC to the wider 
algorithmic accountability literature and show where that literature does and 
does not capture the realities of the new algorithmic technologies of 
governance. 
In pursuing each of these ends, the rich descriptions that follow highlight 
the significant potential, and also the risks, of AI-based governance 
technologies. In adjudication, AI holds the promise of solving the accuracy 
challenge that has bedeviled the SSA for generations. As Jerry Mashaw put it, 
in adjudication “the process is the product.”28 On the one hand, more efficient 
and accurate processing of cases can reduce gross backlogs and might even 
 
28.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the 
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 412 (1996).  
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revive the lost constitutional value of dignity by freeing up judges to provide 
hearings independent of their accuracy benefits. At the same time, supplanting 
human decision making entirely or relegating human decisions to ratification of 
machine recommendations may gut legal process of its dignitary values even if 
the system proves accurate.29 In the enforcement context, machine learning 
promises to aid the SEC in identifying likely violators of the securities laws, by 
enabling the agency to sift through mountains of data. And yet, being singled 
out and made to defend against a regulatory or legal action, even if ultimately 
vindicated, is costly. The process itself, as the saying goes, can be the 
punishment.30 
As a final note, our look beneath the hood at the SSA and SEC concretely 
confirms the transparency concerns that feature heavily in, and indeed 
dominate, the emerging algorithmic accountability literature. But our 
descriptive portrait also introduces issues that have barely registered in that 
literature. First, there are steep technical challenges to automating government 
tasks that trade in large amounts of unstructured text. Second, internal capacity 
building will be central to the AI transition, given the iterative process of 
developing useable tools and the constant threat of gaming. Last, the demand 
for intelligible models may not solely be driven by regulated parties or courts, 
but rather from within the agency itself. Demands for intelligible and 
explainable AI outputs by the front-line staff attorneys at the SSA and line-
level enforcers at the SEC hold the promise of a form of internal due process 
that can help mitigate accountability concerns. While these are important 
insights, much of our analysis in the Parts to come focuses largely on external 
accountability mechanisms. We once more refer the reader interested in these 
other issues to the full ACUS report. 
A. Adjudication of Disability Benefits at the Social Security Administration 
1. The Problem of ALJ Arbitrariness 
Begin with a classic problem of formal adjudication: decisional 
independence risks arbitrariness.31 Figure 1 displays disposition data for SSA 
ALJs in 2018. Each dot represents one ALJ, with number of decisions on the x-
axis and the award rate on the y-axis. We observe extreme variation in award 
rates. In one region, one judge awarded 8% of all cases and another awarded 
98% of all cases. Because cases are randomly assigned within an office, we can 
compare the extent of variation expected under chance alone, plotted in grey. 
 
29.  Id.  
30.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
31.  See HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 15 
(2013); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 21 (1978).  
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We can resoundingly reject the notion that these disparities are the result of 
chance variability. 
Much ink has been spilled on the topic, including the potential for 
appellate review, performance measurement, quality assurance, and peer 
review to cure these deficits.32 Yet while Professor Jerry Mashaw famously 
highlighted the problem of inconsistency some 40 years ago, decisional 
arbitrariness persists to the present day.33 
 
Figure 1. Number of decisions on x-axis against the award rate on the y-axis 
for all ALJs in 2018. The grey interval indicates the pointwise 95% interval 
under the null hypothesis that ALJs have the same underlying grant rate. 
 
32.  JONAH B. GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2016); Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An 
Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017); Daniel E. Ho & Sam Sherman, Managing 
Street-Level Arbitrariness: The Evidence Base for Public Sector Quality Improvement, 13 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 251 (2017); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social 
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974); Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in 
the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 L. & SOC’Y INQUIRY 523 
(2009); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 
(1984). 
33.  See Paul Verkuil, Meeting the Mashaw Test for Consistency in Administrative 
Adjudication, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THE THEMES IN THE WORK 
OF JERRY L. MASHAW (Nicholas Parrillo ed., 2017); David Ames, Cassandra Handan-Nader, Daniel E. 
Ho & David Marcus, Due Process and Mass Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2020).  
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2. Pioneering Applications of AI 
Can AI change this state of affairs? The SSA Appeals Council has 
developed three applications of AI in adjudication.34 The first application 
aimed to address a particular challenge of the existing case assignment system 
to adjudicators: because cases were randomly drawn, adjudicators were 
necessarily forced to crisscross from one body of law to the next. Each different 
area involves a complex set of decisions, with (manual) decision trees mapping 
roughly 2,000 possible paths of disability cases.35 The Appeals Council hence 
developed a clustering algorithm to enable individuals to process cases by 
substantive similarity, enabling adjudicators to develop familiarity with the 
same part of the decision tree. The latent class model used hearing level 
information (e.g., age of claimant, functional impairments, and state of origin) 
to create clusters of comparable cases. Due to labor-management concerns, 
clustering only reordered how cases were processed within an adjudicator’s 
docket, and did not change the composition of cases across adjudicators. In that 
sense, clustering facilitated “micro-specialization,” not macro-specialization 
across adjudicators. Through an early pilot, where branch chiefs could elect to 
use the clustering results, the Appeals Council reported a 7% gain in 
productivity and a 12.5% reduction in errors. 
The second application was aimed to save resources on costly in-person 
hearings by developing a model to predict cases likely to result in full grants. In 
2010, SSA finalized a rule to enable a “Quick Disability Determination” 
(QDD) at the initial decision level.36 The model would use information about 
medical history, treatment protocols, medical symptoms, and findings to predict 
easy grants, to be reviewed by state QDD examiners. Similarly, SSA developed 
a pilot program for expediting claims at the ALJ hearing level. The model used 
Naive Bayes classification with state-level information to predict fully 
favorable dispositions (as opposed to dispositions that are favorable, 
unfavorable, or dismissals), again to be reviewed manually for a recommended 
grant. 
The third, and most ambitious, application is the “Insight” system 
developed by Kurt Glaze, an attorney-turned-analyst at SSA. The system draws 
on the decision trees and policies developed beginning in the 1990s and uses 
structured input to test for adherence with policies. In addition, the system uses 
natural language processing (NLP) (regular expressions, semantic parsing, and 
supervised classification) to flag potential errors and inconsistencies in draft 
 
34.  Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data 
Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of the 
United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1575 
(2015). 
35.  How Data Analysis is Transforming Disability Adjudication at the Social Security 
Administration, Presentation at the Government Performance Summit, May 4-5, 2015.  
36.  Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 16,242 (Mar. 31, 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1619, 416.1019 (2020).  
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decisions. For instance, Insight extracts functional impairments and compares 
whether the impairment is consistent with the job classification in the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles from the Department of Labor.37 Figure 2 
presents an early prototype screenshot of the kind of flag meant to guide 
attorneys and ALJs in the adjudicatory process. The Insight system was 
adopted on a voluntary basis at the Appeals Council in 2016 and at hearing 
offices in 2017. Early results suggested a reduction in processing time and a 
reduction in “returns” to adjudicators for error. 
 
 
Figure 2. Prototype screenshot (modified for visibility) from Insight system 
flagging a potential inconsistency in a draft decision. 
3. Trajectory 
SSA’s adoption of AI has been more advanced than at other adjudicatory 
agencies. While the effect on hearing-level decisions by ALJs remains unclear, 
these applications are suggestive of the future adoption of AI in formal 
adjudication, particularly taking into account rapid advances in natural 
language processing (NLP). Such techniques have wide applicability across 
adjudicatory agencies, from immigration adjudication at the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review to veterans adjudication at the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals to Medicare disputes at the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals. 
In the near future, disposition forecasts may improve the accuracy and 
consistency of decisions by attorneys and ALJs. For instance, each adjudicator 
might be presented with a probabilistic forecast of a grant, against which the 
attorney can compare her own inclination, much in the way that “risk 
assessment scores” in criminal justice are used in pretrial detention decisions. 
In the medium run, feature extraction from claims records folders may help 
adjudicators identify important elements of the case. The claims file currently is 
displayed to attorneys and ALJs in digital (PDF or TIFF) format, and the 
process of manually identifying relevant entries (e.g., medical exam results) is 
time-consuming. Either by adapting NLP-based information extraction tools or 
converting to an electronic health data standard, systems may speed up this 
review of claims folders. The most ambitious version would be the deployment 
of language models to aid in drafting benefits decisions. By extracting 
 
37.  DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (1991), 
https://www.oalj.dol.gov/LIBDOT.HTM [https://perma.cc/A2FF-96PU]. 
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information from the claims folder and using meta-information about the case 
(e.g., knee injury of Gulf War veteran involving a claim for a ratings increase), 
an AI application may someday be capable of predicting the likely language, 
legal authority, and evidentiary basis of the decision: auto-complete for law. 
4. Implications 
On the one hand, the benefits to these tools appear clear: AI might finally 
help crack the code of mass adjudication, improving accuracy, reducing 
inconsistency, and cutting down on rampant backlogs that plague agencies like 
the SSA, the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, the Board of Veterans 
Appeals, and the Executive Office of Immigration Review. Perhaps most 
tantalizing is that if AI can generate more “accurate” (or at least more 
consistent) decisions, it may help reclaim a lost part of constitutional due 
process. The post-Goldberg consensus has been that accuracy is the linchpin of 
due process. As Justice Brennan reasoned in Goldberg, the “hearing has one 
function only . . . to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination . . . .”38 
Yet QDD challenges us to think whether we would indeed want to skip 
hearings when the hearing may not contribute to accuracy. Indeed, eliminating 
hearings may cause the very “societal malaise” that Goldberg worried about.39 
Alternatively, by taking much of the rote and repetitive work out of judging, AI 
might free up judicial resources to focus on procedural fairness elements of the 
job: to hold hearings, provide tentative orders, and engage individuals with 
explanation. One need not look very far into litigant reviews of ALJs to find 
evidence of the dignity value of hearings. Wrote one litigant: “I know I had to 
have shown my complete nervousness but, after speaking and listening to him 
talk with kindness, I felt relief. He was truly a great Judge even though I was 
denied . . . .”40 
On the other hand, the adoption of AI, particularly in light of the 
trajectory of use cases, raises serious questions. First, each of the SSA use cases 
may increasingly displace the exercise of judicial discretion, even when manual 
review remains nominally present. Concrete examples of the resulting 
“automation bias,” or overreliance on machine outputs, are not hard to 
imagine.41 For example, a machine-predicted disposition might allow an ALJ to 
compare her inclination to the wisdom (or foolishness?) of the crowd, 
potentially threatening notions of decisional independence. The search tool may 
 
38.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).  
39.  Id. at 265.  
40.  Administrative Law Judge Case Statistics, DISABILITY JUDGES (Aug. 5, 2012, 
11:27 PM), https://www.disabilityjudges.com/state/virginia/norfolk/james-j-quigley 
[https://perma.cc/W92C-KGP5].  
41.  “Automation bias” refers to the tendency of humans to unreasonably defer to 
automated outputs over time. See Citron, supra note 20, at 1272; R. Parasuraman & D.H. Manzey, 
Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation: An Attentional Integration, 52 HUM. FACTORS 
381 (2010); Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen L. Mosier & Mark Burdick, Does Automation Bias Decision-
Making?, 51 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 991 (1999).  
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allow an ALJ to spend less time reviewing the full record of a case, thus losing 
nuance and eroding de novo review. A machine-generated decision template 
might, whether gradually or more abruptly, convert an ALJ’s role from drafting 
to simply signing an automated body of text, much in the way that standard 
form contracts are signed. And because there will surely be disparities in how 
much effort ALJs will expend to review AI-assisted product, the present inter-
ALJ disparities noted previously42 may be exported into willingness to deviate 
from the automated default. 
Second, if these tools enable centralization of policy control, they raise 
deep questions about separation of functions and powers within agencies. In 
immigration adjudication, for instance, the exemption from performance 
reviews was only secured by letter, not statute or regulation.43 As a result, the 
exemption was later removed, enabling greater forms of presidential control of 
immigration adjudication.44 To the extent that tools like Insight promote such 
control, they may facilitate converting an adjudicatory agency into an executive 
one. 
Third, while automating adjudication may be cost-effective, it may 
undercut the perceived legitimacy of agency decision making. The contrary 
view is expressed by Professor Eugene Volokh, who argues that we should 
“focus on the quality of the proposed AI judge’s product, not on the process 
that yields that product.”45 But for mass adjudicatory agencies, there exists no 
exogenous measure of quality—or, as Jerry Mashaw put it, “no objective, 
external referent for determining [an ‘accurate’ decision].” Hence, “to change 
the process of decision, to ‘reengineer’ it, is to change the product as well.” 
From that perspective, each step of displacing human discretion changes the 
product of adjudication. Without an external referent for accuracy, we should 
be cautious about the implications. Do these use cases undercut the tailoring of 
law to fact? Does it matter if QDD can only be applied to initial decisions that 
are filed electronically, hence disbursing expedited benefits determinations to a 
demographically distinct (albeit large) set of applicants? Does the Insight 
system in fact create a new binding policy in a way that violates administrative 
law’s demands for transparency and explanation? In the long term, these 
developments may erode the APA understanding of formal adjudication. 
Finally, and despite these open questions, we lack even the most basic 
understanding of the impact of algorithmic tools on agency adjudication. To be 
sure, SSA conducted internal studies that indicated that employees who opted 
to use the Insight system identified more errors and processed cases more 
quickly than employees opting against using the Insight system. But usage was 
voluntary, therefore making it hard to attribute performance differences to the 
 
42.  See supra Section I.A.1. 
43.  See Threat to Due Process and Judicial Independence Caused by Performance 
Quotas on Immigration Judges, NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES 1 (Oct. 1, 2017). 
44.  See id.  
45.  Volokh, supra note 18, at 1191.  
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Insight system itself. If more motivated employees adopted the Insight system, 
the performance differences may stem simply from different levels of buy-in. 
In an audit of the Insight system, SSA’s Office of the Inspector General echoed 
this sentiment and concluded that “management should define objectives in 
measurable terms so performance toward achieving those objectives can be 
assessed.”46 Given what is at stake, it is critical that administrative law take 
seriously the turn to algorithmic adjudication, which we consider beginning in 
Part III. 
B. Regulatory Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission 
1. The Challenge of Enforcement 
Agency enforcement poses a classic tradeoff between discretion and 
accountability.47 Discretion is necessary because agency resources are finite but 
regulatory targets, and the monitoring and search costs that an agency accrues 
in identifying them, are nearly limitless.48 Monitoring and search costs can 
quickly eat up agency budgets. Moreover, optimal deterrence does not support 
proceeding against every possible regulatory target. Even enforcement actions 
that are formally cost-justified—that is, actions in which the social benefit 
exceeds the social cost of bringing them—may not be a sound use of agency 
resources given other agency imperatives and priorities.49 But prosecutorial 
discretion—and an agency’s decision when to wield the coercive power of the 
state and when not to—also brings risks. Agency forbearance can mask an 
agency’s infidelity to statutory design and purposes.50 It can also conceal 
arbitrary selection of enforcement targets, which is itself socially costly.51 
Indeed, the mere fact of being targeted for audit or investigation by an agency 
can impose significant harms on regulated parties, even if they are ultimately 
 
46.  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION’S USE OF INSIGHT SOFTWARE TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL ANOMALIES IN HEARING 
DECISIONS 5 (Apr. 2019).  
47.  See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and 
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 935 (2017) (noting “the challenge of 
designing enforcement institutions in a way that promotes accountability while preserving a role for 
independent, professional judgment”). 
48.  See Robert A. Kagan, Editor’s Introduction: Understanding Regulatory 
Enforcement, 11 L. & POL’Y 89, 110 (1989) (“Most regulatory agencies feel chronically understaffed 
and underbudgeted relative to their caseload.”). 
49.  See id. at 93 (noting ideal agency pursues welfare-maximization by “focus[ing] its 
energies where it can do the most good, guided by a sense of what is legally, technologically, 
economically, and politically possible”); Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (offering classic account of optimal deterrence). 
50.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1129, 1150 (2016) (noting that agencies can “behave improperly if the targets it selects for enforcement 
are disproportionately singled out in ways that are unwarranted under the legal standards”).  
51.  See Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
859, 901 (2009) (“If the agency chooses to pursue one class of violators instead of others, that places a 
burden on those who are pursued, and, if the two classes compete with one another, the agency’s action 
provides a relative benefit to those who are not pursued.”). 
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vindicated.52 Process, as we have already noted, can be a costly and undue form 
of punishment.53 
2. Pioneering Applications of AI 
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) development of a suite 
of algorithmic enforcement tools provides a window into the possibilities and 
limits of predictive analytics in reducing agency search costs and making 
agency enforcement decisions more precise and less arbitrary. Three tools in 
particular illustrate the agency’s approach. 
The first two tools target trading-based market-based misconduct. One of 
these, known as the Advanced Relational Trading Enforcement Metrics 
Investigation System, or ARTEMIS, identifies and assesses suspicious trading. 
ARTEMIS “analyzes patterns and relationships among multiple traders using 
the Division’s electronic database of over six billion electronic equities and 
options trading records.”54 This tool aims to catch all instances of insider 
trading in the market and powerfully enhances the SEC’s monitoring and 
surveillance powers. ARTEMIS’s focus is serial offenders and cheaters. This is 
generally thought to be an easier demographic of offenders to find as compared 
to first-time insider trading activities. The other tool, called the Abnormal 
Trading and Link Analysis System (ATLAS), is the newest of the SEC’s 
algorithmic enforcement tools and complements the ARTEMIS tool by 
focusing on first-time, rather than serial, insider trading. 
Neither ARTEMIS nor ATLAS is fully automated. Both first require 
agency enforcement staff to identify a suspected offender before more targeted 
data collection and a full-fledged investigation can proceed. The ARTEMIS 
process typically starts with automated analysis of the public filings of a 
company that has experienced significant stock movement. While companies 
announce important events in scheduled 10-K and 10-R filings, they are also 
required to make announcements regarding material events of particular 
relevance to shareholders in a separate 8-K form. In the first step of the process, 
SEC analysts systematically pool these 8-K forms and then use two separate 
algorithmic tools to parse them. The first tool is an NLP topic model to classify 
documents into categories of significant reported events55—for instance, M&A 
 
52.  See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) (noting that enforcement 
decisions can “result in significant burdens on a defendant or a statutory beneficiary, even if he is 
ultimately vindicated”). As noted below, however, the Court has not found these costs to be legally 
cognizable. 
53.  See FEELEY, supra note 30. 
54.  Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the International 
Institute for Securities Market Growth and Development (April 8, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-mjw-040816.html [https://perma.cc/NP5Z-3FHS]. 
55.  The topic model represents filings in a term-document matrix (“bag of words”) 
and models term generation as a function of latent topics. See David M. Blei & John D. Lafferty, Topic 
Models: Classification, Clustering, and Applications, in TEXT MINING 101 (Ashok N. Srivastava & 
Mehran Sahami eds., 2009). 
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targeting, CEO termination, or FDA approval decisions.56 At the second step, 
this labeled data is pushed through a supervised learning algorithm to flag 
current filings and trigger events that may warrant further investigation. Once 
the data has been sifted and analyzed, a human examiner reviews the results. 
An agency examiner who concludes that trading around a specific 
company’s stock warrants further investigation prepares a “bluesheet request” 
and thus begins the more targeted collection and analysis of trading data.57 
Staff must identify which broker/dealers traded the security at issue by 
obtaining the clearing reports submitted to FINRA.58 Staff must also must 
decide how far back in time to request data.59 In order to ensure that bluesheet-
derived data is high-quality, the SEC and FINRA60 regularly bring charges 
against brokerage firms for inaccurate or incomplete submissions.61 
Once bluesheet data have been collected, SEC staff use the ARTEMIS 
and ATLAS tools to analyze those data alongside data from prior bluesheet 
requests to determine whether the trading activity in question constitutes a 
suspicious anomaly.62 The SEC has not disclosed the precise features the 
 
56.  Event categories include: M&A transaction target, bankruptcy, major commercial 
announcement, scheduled earnings announcements, unscheduled earnings announcement, clinical trial, 
FDA decision announcements, and court judgment.  
57.  A bluesheet is a statutorily authorized investigatory tool the SEC uses to request 
detailed trading data on a particular company’s stock from the broker/dealer community. This 
information includes standard trading information (name of the security, whether the transaction was a 
buy or a sell, long or short, price, and date), as well as personal information about the trading 
participants (name, address, social security number). 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-25 (2020). An example 
electronic bluesheet (also referred to as “EBS”) is publicly available through the FINRA website, and 
can be examined to understand the criteria of data requested by the SEC. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., 
ELECTRONIC BLUESHEET SUBMISSIONS 6 (Jan. 29, 2018), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-18-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DGJ-2X9S]. 
58.  WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS app. J7 (2d ed. 
2013); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.2.2 (Nov. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter SEC Enforcement Manual] (describing bluesheets). 
59.  SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 58, § 3.2.2; Telephone Interview with Scott 
Bauguess, Former Deputy Dir. & Deputy Chief Economist, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2019) 
[hereinafter Bauguess Interview]. 
60.  FINRA is the acronym for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority that, in its 
own words, is “a not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress to protect America’s investors by 
making sure the broker-dealer industry operates fairly and honestly.” See FINRA, 
https://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/F7WV-GUTY]. 
61.  For instance, in June 2016, FINRA fined Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. $6 
million for failing to meet regulatory reporting requirements in bluesheets generated from 2008-2015. 
The firm had submitted thousands of bluesheets that misreported or omitted critical information on over 
a million trades. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup Provided Incomplete Blue Sheet 
Data for 15 Years (Jul. 12, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-138.html 
[https://perma.cc/KED7-5Y3G]. And in July 2016, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. was fined $7 million 
by the SEC for submitting 2,382 erroneous bluesheets from 1999 to 2014. Citigroup contended that 
these errors were attributable to a coding failure in Citigroup’s internal electronic bluesheet system. 
Press Release, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA Fines Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. $6 Million for 
Submitting Inaccurate and Late Blue Sheet Data (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2016/finra-fines-deutsche-bank-securities-inc-6-million-submitting-
inaccurate-and-late-blue [https://perma.cc/U6JW-TQGC]. 
62.  Bauguess Interview, supra note 59. 
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agency uses in either tool to make these determinations. However, the features 
used in the ATLAS tool are said to be “intuitive” and presumably focus on 
whether the trade was explicable for the trader given the context and also the 
trader’s historical behavior.63 The ARTEMIS tool uses an unsupervised 
learning model for anomaly detection. The ATLAS tool, by contrast, uses a 
supervised model called a one-class support vector machine (SVM) to 
determine if a particular trade is suspicious.64 The potential regulatory targets 
who are fed into the ATLAS model are split into two categories: those who lost 
money on a trade, and those who made money. The SVM is trained on the 
former, then fit to the latter. The assumption is that the behavior of those who 
made money should not differ significantly from those who lost money over 
time. Outliers identified by both tools are treated as suspicious.65 
A third AI-based enforcement tool parses the narrative disclosures that 
investment advisors and other agency “registrants” make to the SEC to predict 
which among them may be violating the securities laws and so should be 
subject to more stringent treatment under the agency’s examination program.66 
Under that program, the SEC is responsible for conducting examination of a 
wide range of entities registered with the SEC, including tens of thousands of 
investment advisors, broker dealers, and mutual funds and exchange traded 
funds.67 The sheer scope of the program creates significant opportunities to 
economize on scarce agency resources by concentrating examination efforts on 
a subset of registrants. 
Because the Form ADV disclosures that investment advisors make to the 
agency are comprised, at least in part, of free text, NLP algorithms are used to 
normalize the inputs for analysis.68 That process consists of three steps: (i) text 
 
63.  Features might include how often a trader trades the company’s stock, how often 
she trades other stocks, how many shares were traded in comparison to the trader’s other trades, and the 
time between the announcement and the trade. Telephone Interview with Staff, Complex Financial 
Instruments Unit, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter SEC Staff Interview I]. 
64.  An SVM is a classifier that uses training data to create an optimal hyperplane that 
categorizes new examples. Savan Patel, Chapter 2: SVM (Support Vector Machine) — Theory, in 
MACHINE LEARNING 101 (May 3, 2017), https://medium.com/machine-learning-101/chapter-2-svm-
support-vector-machine-theory-f0812effc72 [https://perma.cc/EGB4-DJDA].  
65.  SEC Staff Interview I, supra note 63. 
66.  The full name for these filings is the “Uniform Application for Investment 
Adviser Registration and Report by Exempt Reporting Adviser.” 
67.  The SEC puts it this way: 
OCIE is responsible for conducting examinations of entities registered with the SEC, 
including more than 13,200 investment advisers, approximately 10,000 mutual funds and 
exchange traded funds, roughly 3,800 broker-dealers, about 330 transfer agents, seven active 
clearing agencies, 21 national securities exchanges, nearly 600 municipal advisors, FINRA, 
the MSRB, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, among others. 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations 
Announces 2019 Examination Priorities (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-
299 [https://perma.cc/GT2H-GGJJ]. 
68.  Telephone Interview with Staff, Office of Research and Data Services, Div. of 
Econ. & Risk Analysis and Office of Analytics and Research, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 20, 2019) 
[hereinafter SEC Staff Interview II]. That form contains two parts. The first concerns the investment 
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extraction from PDF forms and segmentation into sections that answer specific 
questions from the form;69 (ii) unsupervised learning to cluster types of 
documents and detect anomalies;70 (iii) supervised learning using prior Form 
ADVs associated with referrals to the agency’s enforcement arm to classify 
each investment advisor as “high,” “medium,” or “low” risk.71 Entities flagged 
as “high” risk are passed on to SEC enforcement staff, with an explanation 
detailing the weight each feature was given by the model in calculating the 
score.72 
3. Trajectory 
As a well-resourced agency with significant technical capacity, the SEC 
sits well ahead of most other federal agencies in developing AI-based 
enforcement tools. But the SEC is by no means alone in its efforts. The Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Internal Revenue Service, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency are all at various stages of development 
and deployment of algorithmic tools designed to predict illegal conduct or more 
precisely allocate scarce agency resources toward audit or investigation.73 
More, and more advanced, enforcement tools are surely on the way. Continued 
advances in NLP are likely to improve the accuracy of enforcement targeting. 
While word embeddings are not easily adapted to the securities domain—one 
of the top 10 embeddings for the word “insider” is “bigwig”74—cutting-edge 
language models (e.g., Google’s BERT model) may facilitate transfer learning 
to adapt large-scale models to more jargon-filled legal texts and more domain-
specific tasks with less training data. In the long-term, the most audacious 
 
advisor’s “business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, and any disciplinary 
events of the adviser or its employees.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FAST ANSWERS: FORM ADV (Mar. 11, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html [https://perma.cc/HVD9-P2JL]. The 
second involves the advisor’s services offered, fee schedule, “disciplinary information, conflicts of 
interest, and the educational and business background of management and key advisory personnel of the 
adviser.” Id. 
69.  SEC Staff Interview II, supra note 68. 
70.  This approach can be done via Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), which uses a 
“bag of words” representation of text. This approach finds all of the words that are in a document and 
finds how many times they are repeated. The document “John bought stocks. Mary bought stocks”, 
would be converted to BoW = {“John”:1,”bought”:2,”stocks”:2,”Mary”:1}. See David M. Blei, Andrew 
Y. Ng & Michael I. Jordan, Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993 (2003). 
71.  This is done using a random forest model, an ensemble learning technique that 
generates many decision trees to classify data given a set of predicative labels. At inference time, each 
decision tree votes on how the data should be classified. See TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & 
JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND 
PREDICTION 587-604 (2d ed. 2009).  
72.  Feature importance is calculated by calculating Gini importance. Cechine Lee, 
Feature Importance Measures for Tree Models – Part I: An Incomplete Review (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://medium.com/the-artificial-impostor/feature-importance-measures-for-tree-models-part-i-
47f187c1a2c3 [https://perma.cc/F9QQ-RZM8].  
73.  See GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM, supra note 17. 
74.  This is based on word2vec trained on the English GoogleNews Negative300 
corpus. TURKUMLP GROUP, http://bionlp-www.utu.fi/wv_demo [https://perma.cc/UDB4-CG5C].  
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applications of AI could automate each step of an investigation (e.g., sending 
inquiry letters, compiling answers) all the way to filing an enforcement action. 
Just as the SSA’s tools could become auto-complete for adjudication, these 
tools could become auto-complete for enforcement. 
That said, the SEC’s new algorithmic enforcement toolkit highlights some 
challenges as well. Such tools can only be as good as their data inputs, and 
unlocking AI’s full potential in the enforcement context requires abundant, 
well-labeled data that accurately reflect ground truth. An initial challenge is 
non-randomness, as exemplified by the bluesheet process that feeds the SEC’s 
ARTEMIS and ATLAS tools. That process, as noted previously, is neither 
comprehensive nor random. Instead, it is hypothesis-driven and reflects the 
assumptions, heuristics, and biases of enforcement staff in each case. 
Moreover, the ARTEMIS and ATLAS tools are trained on a pool of trading 
data that includes only prior bluesheet requests, not total trading activity.75 
When searching for patterns that suggest insider trading, the SEC’s algorithmic 
tools compare current behavior to previously flagged behavior, not traders in 
the market as a whole, potentially impairing system accuracy. The IRS has 
historically solved this problem with random audit data, but no such gold 
standard data exists for the SEC. 
A second and related challenge arises at the nexus of automation and 
human discretion. When line-level enforcement staff retain ultimate authority 
to initiate enforcement, uncritical reliance on automation may displace 
investigatorial attention away from false negatives and crowd out the exercise 
of discretion with suspected positives.76 If prior enforcement actions serve as 
training data or determine the labels applied to that data, the system may 
unduly confine enforcement to a subset of violations. This phenomenon is well 
established in the predictive policing context: when a predictive model is used 
to deploy police patrols, and the resulting arrest data is used to retrain the 
 
75.  Bauguess Interview, supra note 59. Interestingly, the extent of the agency’s 
transparency across the entire market may soon change. On November 15, 2016, the SEC approved a 
joint plan with FINRA and SROs to develop a consolidated audit trail (“CAT”). Press Release, Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Plan to Create Consolidated Audit Trail (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-240.html [https://perma.cc/EL63-6KMT]. Adopted under 
SEC Rule 613, CAT requires SROs and broker-dealers to significantly enhance their information 
technology capacities to maintain a comprehensive database of granular trading activity in the U.S. 
equity and options markets. Rule 613 (Consolidated Audit Trail), SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info.htm [https://perma.cc/LCW7-K49H]. Rule 
613 establishes a timeline for implementing CAT in the national market system (“NMS”). The reporting 
requirement went into effect for SROs on November 15, 2017, and to large broker-dealers on November 
15, 2018. Smaller broker-dealers will have to be compliant for CAT reporting by November 15, 2019. 
CAT is poised to become the biggest central repository of stock exchange data, and broadens the 
reporting requirement to every trade quote and order, origination, modification, execution, routing, and 
cancellation. Id.; see also Perspectives: Consolidated Audit Trail: The Wait Is Over, DELOITTE (Aug. 
2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/sec-rule-613-consolidated-
audit-trail-national-market-system-nms-plan-banking-securities.html [https://perma.cc/J4CP-KGHZ]. 
76.  For more on automation bias, see note 41, supra.  
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model, the potential for a “runaway feedback loop” exists.77 Police may be sent 
to the same neighborhoods over and over again, even if the underlying crime 
rate was random. In short, without proper safeguards, algorithmic detection at 
the SEC and elsewhere could become dominated by superficial features from 
prior enforcement decision making, replicating the idiosyncrasies and biases of 
line-level enforcers rather than building richer and more precise models of 
noncompliance. 
The dynamic nature of wrongdoing poses a final challenge. For many 
agencies, enforcement resembles a game of “whack-a-mole” as regulated 
parties develop new artifices designed to evade, or narrowly navigate between, 
announced rules. Taking an example from tax, an algorithmic tool might be 
able to flag the complicated and choreographed set of transactions needed to 
implement an illegal tax shelter. But once agency enforcement begins, 
taxpayers and the tax compliance industry shift away and develop new artifices 
that are identifiable to algorithmic enforcement tools only if they are 
sufficiently similar to the prior ones.78 For agencies using algorithmic 
enforcement tools, the challenge is how to continually and iteratively update 
them to capture new modes of wrongdoing.79 
4. Implications 
Development and deployment of algorithmic tools at the SEC and other 
agencies hold significant implications for the future. Two broad implications 
dominate. 
First, the new algorithmic enforcement tools hold important implications 
for the accountability of agency enforcement activities. It remains unclear 
whether the new tools will degrade or enhance legal and political 
accountability relative to the status quo. On the one hand, the technical opacity 
and “black box” nature of the more sophisticated AI-based tools may erode 
overall accountability by rendering agency enforcement decisions even more 
inscrutable than the human judgments of dispersed agency enforcement staff. 
But the opposite might also prove true: formalizing and making explicit agency 
priorities could render an agency’s enforcement decision making relatively 
more tractable compared to pools of agency enforcement staff. We return to 
these possibilities in Part II’s exploration of administrative law’s response to 
the new algorithmic governance tools. 
 
77.  Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing (Dec. 22, 
2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847 [https://perma.cc/4APU-N8QK]. For a more general survey of 
potential problems with predictive policing, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 
94 WASH U.L. REV. 1109 (2017).  
78.  Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-Evolution of Tax 
Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood, ICAIL ‘15 (2015), https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/taxpaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3BR-M4AR].  
79.  Cf. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2017) (noting that systems require “ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation to ensure the model remains accurate given that the real-world changes”). 
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Second, AI-based enforcement tools may work a fundamental change in 
the structure and legitimacy of the regulatory state. Algorithmic enforcement 
tools can, by reducing agency search costs, facilitate more robust enforcement 
activity by permitting agencies to identify regulatory targets more efficiently 
and shift scarce resources away from regulatory search and toward prosecution. 
These tools can also serve as force multipliers, narrowing the public-private 
technology gap and helping to level the playing field between underfunded 
agencies and well-resourced regulated parties. They could hence halt or even 
reverse the decades-long shift away from public enforcement and toward 
private litigation as a regulatory mode.80 Indeed, one explanation for the shift 
from public to private enforcement, achieved largely via legislative creation of 
private rights of action, was a fiscally focused legislative desire to move 
enforcement costs from on-budget to off-budget forms.81 A significant 
reduction in regulatory search costs could alter that core legislative calculus. 
That said, as algorithmic tools move closer to the core of the state’s 
coercive power, they may systematically shift patterns of state action in ways 
that raise distributive and, ultimately, political anxieties about a newly digitized 
public sector. One broad concern centers on the potential distributive effects of 
algorithmic enforcement, particularly from gaming.82 Well-heeled regulated 
parties may be better able than their less advantaged peers to reverse-engineer 
an agency’s algorithmic tools and take actions to avoid or even foil detection. 
As just one example, major investment banks may be more likely to have a 
stable of sophisticated employees with computer science and quantitative 
training who can reverse-engineer the SEC’s algorithmic tools, thus shielding 
their own registrants from agency enforcement efforts.83 If citizens come to 
believe AI systems are rigged, political support for a more effective, tech-savvy 
government could quickly evaporate. 
Still another concern is that the advent of algorithmic enforcement will 
supplant expertise within the bureaucracy, exacerbating a perceived trend 
toward politicized administration and the hollowing out of the expertise of the 
 
80.  SEAN FARHANG. THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010). 
81.  Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American 
Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 823-28 (2008) (reviewing the debate); David 
Freeman Engstrom & David Hausman, Rights, Redistribution, and the Rise of the “Litigation State”: 
The Case of Disability Discrimination Laws, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2020) (testing the 
theory). 
82.  See David Freeman Engstrom et al., Enforcement by Algorithm (June 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Jane R. Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm 
Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10 (2018) (exploring more general phenomenon of “gaming,” in 
which a clever adversary identifies and then exploits weaknesses in an algorithmic system).  
83.  A further example we discuss in more detail below comes from the adjudication 
side of things: A firm that knows that the PTO is using “deep learning” to detect similar trademarks 
could, in theory, develop an adversarial model to fool trademark examiners into thinking that a 
trademark is distinctive.  
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administrative state.84 This is especially worrying because, at least for the 
moment, line-level enforcers can play a key role in bolstering accountability. 
Currently, use of algorithmic enforcement tools by SEC enforcement staff is 
entirely voluntary. As a result, agency technologists must sell skeptical line-
level staff on their tools and provide user-friendly interfaces. Perhaps more 
importantly, SEC technologists report that line-level enforcement staff are often 
unmoved by a model’s sparse classification of an investment advisor, based on 
dozens of pages of disclosures, as “high risk.”85 They want to know which 
section of a disclosure triggered the classification and why. This has further 
pressed agency technologists to focus on explainability in their models. Staff 
skepticism thus raises the interesting possibility that governance of public 
sector AI tools will at times come from “internal” due process, not the judge-
enforced, external variety.86 That said, SEC officials could change the agency’s 
current approach, making use of the tools mandatory or keying agency 
decisions primarily or entirely to machine outputs. To that extent, the SEC 
could quickly increase the centrality and significance of the tools and sharpen 
accountability concerns. 
II. Current Administrative Law and the Puzzle of Algorithmic Accountability 
The new algorithmic governance tools like those on display at the SSA 
and SEC trigger a sharp collision. On the one hand, the body of law that 
governs how agencies do their work is premised on transparency, 
accountability, and reason giving.87 When government takes action that affects 
 
84.  On the risks of hollowing out, see PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS 
SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014); and PAUL VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE 
CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017).  
85.  GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM, supra note 17, at 28. 
86.  To that extent, bureaucratic implementation of algorithmic enforcement tools may 
roughly resemble a dynamic noted by others in which the interactions of internal and sometimes 
“rivalrous” bureaucratic actors shape agency behavior. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE. L.J. 2314 (2006); Amanda 
Leiter, Soft Whistleblowing, 48 GA. L. REV. 425, 429 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent 
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Jon. D. 
Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New 
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016). 
87.  In the American context, this norm pervades administrative law, both in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (2018) (“All [agency] decisions [with 
respect to procedures requiring a hearing] . . . shall include a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, 
and the reasons or basis therefor . . . .”), and in judicial decisions, see Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 
45 (2011) (“When an administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its 
action.”); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (noting “the requirement that 
an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action”). Similar versions can be found in many Western 
legal systems. For a review, see Henrik Palmer Olsen et al., What’s in the Box? The Legal Requirement 
of Explainability in Computationally Aided Decision-Making in Public Administration 14-22 (iCourts 
Working Paper Series No. 162, 2019).  
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rights, it must explain why. On the other hand, the most advanced forms of AI 
are not yet, by their structure, fully explainable.88 
This Part addresses this core collision. It begins by reviewing an emerging 
algorithmic accountability literature and highlights that literature’s 
shortcomings, particularly its failure to reckon in any sustained manner with the 
possibilities and limits of conventional administrative law in achieving 
meaningful accountability. It then makes a start toward more sustained 
attention to administrative law as the front-line regulator of AI-based 
governance tools, following administrative law’s foundational distinction 
between ex post and ex ante review of agency action and detailing some of the 
common and also distinctive legal puzzles that arise when applied to 
adjudication and enforcement. It concludes by mining Part I’s technical and 
operational descriptions of the SSA’s and SEC’s new algorithmic tools to build 
an account of the non-legal, informational challenges of APA-based review of 
algorithmic agency action. 
Throughout we make the case that judicial review of agency action, at 
least in its current guise, is unlikely to yield systematic, as opposed to pocketed 
and even idiosyncratic, oversight of agency use of algorithmic decision making 
tools. Under existing interpretations and doctrines, administrative law will 
provide few systematic incentives for agency administrators to improve internal 
administration and, at best, yield a checkerboard system of external 
accountability. 
A. The Existing Algorithmic Accountability Literature 
A fast-growing academic literature explores the clash between algorithmic 
opacity and legal demands of accountability and reason giving, much of it 
through the lens of constitutional due process. That high-level framing, with its 
focus on balancing the private interest, the government interest, and the 
marginal value of additional process, has spawned inquiry along two distinct 
tracks. 
The first track asks what level of transparency into an algorithmic 
system’s workings is necessary to gauge the system’s fidelity to law. It starts 
from a well-established pair of ideas. One is that advanced machine learning 
outputs are inscrutable in the sense that even their own engineers cannot 
necessarily understand how the most advanced models arrived at a given 
result.89 Machine learning outputs are also often non-intuitive in that the rules 
they derive to make predictions are so complex and multi-faceted that they defy 
practical inspection or do not comport with any practical human belief about 
 
88.  See, e.g., Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in 
Machine Learning Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2016). 
89.  See Andrew Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable 
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1094-96 (2018). For a highly accessible version, see JUDEA 
PEARL & DANA MCKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT 359 (2018).  
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how the world works.90 As a result, even perfect transparency into an 
algorithmic system—that is, unfettered access to its source code and data and 
the chance to observe its operation “in the wild”91—may not yield 
accountability in the sense of rendering decisions fully legible to data subjects 
or surfacing all of a system’s flaws.92 Indeed, we know surprisingly little about 
why the most advanced neural networks work, although much active work 
exists to provide explainable AI.93 Instead, desired transparency may only be 
approximated by mixing and matching multiple, partial modes of explanation. 
That is, one might be able to gain insight into a system’s operation by 
combining a “decision-level” accounting of a given decision’s “provenance” 
via the machine’s inputs and outputs with a “system-level” accounting of the 
 
90.  See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 89, at 1096-99.  
91.  See Aaron Rieke, Miranda Bogen & David G. Robinson, Public Scrutiny of 




 92.  Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 661 
(2017) (noting that input-output testing—that is, basic “black box testing”—is “least powerful” among 
testing methods because of the inability to attribute a cause to a change in output or gauge its 
significance). For a more general version of the point, see Ananny & Crawford, supra note 21, at 980 
(“Seeing inside a system does not necessarily mean understanding its behavior or origins.”); and id. at 
981 (noting that the “ephemeral nature of computational representations” may be incompatible with 
transparency). On the insufficiency of code alone, see Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: 
Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms, Data and Discrimination: 
Converting Critical Concerns in Productive Inquiry, 64TH ANN. MEETING OF THE INT’L COMM. ASS’N 
(May 22, 2014), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~csandvig/research/Auditing%20Algorithms%20—
%20Sandvig%20—%20ICA%202014%20Data%20and%20Discrimination%20Preconference.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CTE7-L4UK]. Most agree that transparency requires, at a minimum, a description of a 
decision’s “provenance,” including an accounting of its inputs and outputs and the main factors that 
drove it. A more robust accounting of a decision’s provenance would also convey the minimum change 
necessary to yield a different outcome and provide explanations for similar cases with different 
outcomes and different cases with similar outcomes. See Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, 
Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation (Berkman Klein Ctr. Working Paper, 
2019), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/34372584/2017-11_aiexplainability-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D63K-8ELW]. However, while emerging techniques are rendering machine learning 
models more interpretable by ranking, sorting, and scoring data features according to their impact in the 
model, or using visualization techniques or textual justifications to lay bare a model’s decision 
“pathway,” challenges remain, especially with larger, multi-dimensional models. For a recent review of 
this highly active research area, see Ashraf Abdul, Jo Vermeulen, Dandling Wang, Brian Y. Lim & 
Mohan Kankanhalli, Trends and Trajectories for Explainable, Accountable, and Intelligible Systems, An 
HCI Research Agenda, CHI ‘18 (2018), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3173574.3174156 
[https://perma.cc/C2GS-PH25]. Another approach to interpretability uses visualization techniques or 
machine-based textual justifications to lay bare a model’s decision “pathway.” See L.A. Hendricks et al., 
Generating Visual Explanations, EUR. CONF. ON COMPUTER VISION 3-19 (2016); Chris Olah et al., The 
Building Blocks of Interpretability, DISTILL (Mar. 6, 2018), https://distill.pub/2018/building-blocks 
[https://perma.cc/HA2L-8MCP]. That said, input-output analysis need not be technical. Some advocate 
interactive “tinker” interfaces that allow data subjects to manually enter and change data and observe 
results, yielding a “partial functional feel for the logic of the system.” Selbst & Barocas, supra note 89, 
at 1116.  
93.  Wojciech Samek, Thomas Wiegand & Klaus-Robert Müller, Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence: Understanding, Visualizing and Interpreting Deep Learning Models (2017), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.08296 [https://perma.cc/4BRM-V3XZ]. 
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tool’s “purpose, design, and core functioning,”94 such as data descriptions, 
modeling choices, and the like.95 
The second track in the literature tours the mechanisms that regulatory 
architects might choose—in an ideal world, and without political constraints—
in order to translate a given level of transparency into desired accountability. 
The typical result is a menu of regulatory possibilities that tracks the options 
available in any regulatory context. These include individual, rights-based 
measures (e.g., private lawsuits; whistleblower schemes that incentivize those 
with insider knowledge to surface misconduct; vesting data subjects with rights 
to notice, consent, correction, and erasure), more systemic modes of oversight 
(e.g., public regulation by a separate oversight agency, or an FDA-like 
licensing or certification scheme, before an algorithmic system deploys), and 
assorted other accountability-boosting measures, including “soft” rules (e.g., 
impact assessments).96 
This literature has generated an initial set of insights about the 
accountability challenges of algorithmic governance. An example is Danielle 
Citron’s observation that the test for procedural due process, which requires 
courts to focus on the case at hand and weigh the private interest, government 
interest, and likely value of additional process, may miss the fact that 
algorithmic tools are designed to operate at scale. Potentially lost in case-level 
balancing is the possibility that a one-time but costly increase in procedural 
 
94.  Selbst & Barocas, supra note 89, at 1099-1110 (offering an accessible explanation 
of the debate over “outcome-based” and “logic-based” explanations). For similar efforts to categorize 
explanation types, see Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to an 
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 55-59 
(2017) (distinguishing between “model-centric” and “subject-centric” explanations); and Sandra 
Wachter, Brent Mittlestadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-
Making Does not Exist in General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017) 
(distinguishing between explanations of “system functionality” and “specific decisions”).  
95.  See RIEKE ET AL., supra note 91, at 18; Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, supra 
note 20, at 20-22; Selbst & Barocas, supra note 89, at 1129; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851 (2019) (noting the 
potential for rulemaking processes to memorialize modeling and other design choices). Beyond the 
transparency issue, a second foundational point made along the first track is that algorithms are not self-
executing technical creations, but rather human-machine “assemblages.” Ananny & Crawford, supra 
note 21, at 983; see also Citron, supra note 20, at 1264-66 (providing a taxonomy of “mixed systems”). 
Programmers must make myriad decisions, from how to partition the data, what model types to specify, 
what dataset, target variables (or class labels), and data features to use, and how much to tune the model. 
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine 
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 683-700 (2017); see also Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, 
supra note 20, at 12 (noting that algorithms are “repeatedly guided and nudged, but not dictated, by 
humans in the establishment and refinement of the algorithm”). For an accessible account of target 
variables, class labels, and data features, see L. Jason Anastasapoulos & Andrew B. Whitford, Machine 
Learning for Public Administration Research, with Application to Organizational Reputation, 29 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 491 (2019). As a result, arbitrary or biased outputs can result from tainted code 
and data, but also from numerous other human-made design choices. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 
20, at 678; Kroll et al., supra note 92, at 679-82.  
96.  See Margot Kaminski, Binary Governance, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1564 
(2019); see also Desai & Kroll, supra note 79, at 46; Tutt, supra note 25. 
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scrutiny of an algorithmic tool can yield massive social benefits across the 
thousands or millions of cases to which the tool is applied.97 
However, the existing literature also falls short on several counts. For 
instance, most treatments abstract away from the technical and operational 
details of actual algorithmic tools. These analyses often commingle public and 
private sector AI use despite the very different logics, stakes, and legal 
imperatives governing each.98 Both shortcomings have pushed much of the 
inquiry to a level of abstraction that lends itself to broad mappings of normative 
concerns rather than concrete regulatory solutions. 
A third issue is a more crippling blind spot: a near-total lack of any 
sustained or close consideration of administrative law. This is concerning 
because administrative law, far more than constitutional law, will modulate 
agency use of algorithmic governance tools as they are incorporated into the 
work of government. The canon of constitutional avoidance—which holds that 
courts should avoid ruling on constitutional issues in favor of other, often 
statutory, grounds—means that administrative law, not constitutional law, will 
often be the legal constraint of first resort.99 The virtual absence of 
administrative law from the emerging literature on algorithmic governance 
tools is also narrowing and even self-defeating. Administrative law’s approach 
to the issues of transparency and reason giving that are fueling concerns about 
the new algorithmic governance is multi-faceted and tailored to particular 
governance tasks, providing a richer and as yet unexplored set of frames for 
assessing and resolving the accountability dilemmas in an increasingly 
digitized government. 
The rest of this Part makes a start toward more sustained attention to 
administrative law as the front-line regulator of AI-based governance tools. It 
does so by following administrative law’s foundational distinction between ex 
post and ex ante review of agency action, detailing some of the legal puzzles 
raised by each. It then mines Part I’s effort to surface the technical and 
operational details of the SSA’s and SEC’s new algorithmic tools to build an 
account of the non-legal challenges of APA-based review of algorithmic 
agency action. Throughout we make the case that judicial review of agency 
decisions incorporating algorithmic analyses will not, without significant 
adaptation of existing administrative law doctrine, yield systematic external 
accountability. 
 
97.  Citron, supra note 20, at 1249. 
98.  See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  
99.  Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (“[N]ormally the Court 
will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the 
case.”). 
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B. Current Administrative Law: Ex Post Review of Algorithmic Decisions 
Under current administrative law, ex post judicial review of agency action 
using AI is unlikely to yield systematic scrutiny. In the adjudication context, 
administrative law’s various reviewability doctrines do not shield agency 
action, but the chance of ex post review of something like the QDD algorithm 
remains slim. In the enforcement context, by contrast, a thicket of reviewability 
and related doctrines largely insulate algorithmic decision making from judicial 
oversight. In what follows, we explore these difficulties to securing judicial 
review, but it is worth noting at the outside that they might also account for why 
and where AI innovation has transpired in federal agencies. Indeed, our 
interviews corroborate that strategic agency officials have piloted use cases 
precisely with insulation from judicial scrutiny in mind.100 
1. Ex Post Review of Adjudicatory Decisions 
While we will see that reviewability poses less of a concern in formal 
adjudication than in enforcement, the chances of judicial review of existing 
algorithmic decision tools like the SSA’s QDD tool for detecting “easy grants” 
remain slim. 
For QDD beneficiaries, the early grant consummates the agency’s 
decision process. Such QDD beneficiaries are unlikely to challenge the QDD 
methodology and likely lack standing to do so. On the other hand, individuals 
who were not selected for the QDD process may be able to challenge SSA’s 
decision once final, but harmless error may insulate scrutiny of the algorithm. 
In Webb ex rel. Z.D. v. Colvin, the appellant challenged an ALJ’s refusal to 
consider reclassifying the case as a “critical case” for expedited processing 
because the ALJ misunderstood the Hearing Appeals and Litigation Law 
Manual.101 The court found that the judge’s failure to reclassify the case did not 
prejudice the ultimate benefits determination, rejecting the claim. A similar 
logic would likely govern review of the QDD model. As in the enforcement 
context, for litigants who lost their ultimate determination, their challenge to 
QDD would simply merge with the merits. In that posture, litigants are unlikely 
to focus much effort on the QDD algorithm itself. For litigants who won their 
final claim, but did not receive the benefit of QDD, the question is closer. They 
are the group most likely to have been misclassified by the algorithm and hence 
harmed by the time delay in receiving benefits. (If resources were fixed, the net 
effect on these claimants may indeed have been to prolong the benefits 
adjudication process.) While back pay would ultimately be awarded, the 
hardship to either (a) borrow money or (b) restrict consumption while claims 
 
100.  GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM, supra note 17, at 39. 
101.  No. 12-1059, 2013 WL 5020495, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2013) (quoting 
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000)) (“[B]ecause ‘HALLEX does not carry the authority 
of law,’ the ALJ’s error warrants remand only if Plaintiff’s claim was prejudiced by the error.”). 
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are pending could be serious. The litigants might hence have standing to 
challenge the implementation of QDD. 
On the merits, Mathews v. Eldridge’s due process framework offers 
limited hope.102 The private interest—the earlier receipt of benefits in the 
presence of backpay—may not be deemed large. Second, the probable value of 
additional process—e.g., the ability to probe the validity of the algorithm—may 
not be high, at least relative to the additional cost in governmental procedures. 
Providing all SSA applicants notice and the ability to probe the validity of the 
QDD algorithm, when experts would need to participate in hearings, would be 
costly. To be sure, a hearing that allows parties to scrutinize the algorithm 
could lead to system-wide improvements in accuracy, but the piecemeal 
appeals process for SSA decisions arguably (a) provides little incentive for 
litigants to bear that cost when challenging a claimant-specific error, and (b) 
requires aggregating government cost of additional procedures to scrutinize 
algorithms. Indeed, subjecting all AI tools to opportunity for full-blown 
interrogation could undercut the incentive to adopt algorithmic decision tools in 
the first instance. 
While procedural due process may not be well suited, litigants may 
challenge QDD—or the clustering tool or the Insight system—under standard 
APA review for adherence to the enabling act and for arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. Yet under such merits review, courts run into significant 
information challenges that we document further below. 
2. Ex Post Review of Enforcement Decisions 
In contrast to formal adjudication, modern administrative law erects 
substantial barriers to ex post judicial review of enforcement decisions.103 
Selective prosecution—i.e., the assertion that another entity is just as bad or 
worse, or “why me and not them”—is a non-starter absent constitutionally 
recognized racial or other bias.104 Moreover, under the APA, courts generally 
 
102.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
103.  Lisa S. Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); see also Van Loo, supra note 23, at 378 (noting that 
“regulatory monitors operate in the ‘soft’ administrative law space largely exempted from the APA’s 
accountability mechanisms”). For a more general argument that administrative law focuses primarily on 
rulemaking and adjudicative hearings and thus misses large tranches of administrative action, see 
Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 95, 106-09 (2003); William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 70-71 (2015).  
104.  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) 
(noting that selective prosecution claims are a “rara avis,” and finding that the concerns that underscored 
its holding in Armstrong were “magnified” in the deportation context); United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (articulating a strong presumption of regularity in prosecutorial decisions and 
requiring a defendant claiming selective prosecution to show discriminatory purpose and that the state’s 
action was “‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and 
oppressive’ that the system of prosecution amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal protection of the 
law”) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 
249 (1980) (noting that “traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny 
09. ENGSTROM  HO ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/30/2020 8:36 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:800 2020 
830 
lack jurisdiction to review an agency’s decision whether or when to enforce. In 
the doctrine’s standard formulation, a federal agency’s decision to initiate a 
civil enforcement action is, like a criminal prosecutor’s charging decision, 
insulated from judicial review as a core executive responsibility committed to 
agency discretion by law.105 We consider first the case of a challenge to a non-
enforcement decision (typically by a beneficiary of enforcement) and then a 
challenge to an enforcement decision (typically by the enforcement target 
itself). 
a) Regulatory Beneficiaries—Challenging Agency Non-Enforcement 
The principle that agency enforcement decisions should be insulated from 
judicial review extends to both agency decisions to enforce and not enforce, but 
it has particular force in the latter context, as when regulatory beneficiaries 
seek to compel rather than block agency action.106 The well-known doctrinal 
fountainhead is Heckler v. Chaney, in which the Court created a strong 
presumption against review that can be rebutted only under narrow 
circumstances.107 
The first exception, articulated a decade before Chaney in Dunlop v. 
Bachowski,108 triggers when Congress has articulated guidelines for the 
agency’s exercise of its enforcement authority by making enforcement 
mandatory (“shall enforce”) coupled with a standard against which to judge 
agency refusals to do so.109 Federal statutes meeting Dunlop’s requirements are 
rare, but, where they exist, an agency’s use of an algorithmic tool can plainly 
be reviewed for its fidelity to congressional command. The resulting review can 
 
cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or 
were otherwise contrary to law,” but then making clear that judicial concern will be limited to the 
context of the “financial or personal interest on one who performs a prosecutorial function”). Short of 
this, only a class-of-one, rational-basis challenge is possible. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 
U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (citing Olech 
and noting that the standard for a “class of one” equal protection challenge is that the plaintiff was 
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment”). For analysis of the interplay between selective prosecution claims and claims 
under the APA, see United States v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 
(S.D. Ohio 2003). 
105.  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018) (prohibiting review of questions that are “committed 
to agency discretion”).  
106.  For an overview of administrative law doctrine that “forestall[s] challenges to 
systemic nonenforcement and agency inaction,” see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to 
Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1872 (2015).  
107.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Lower courts have extended the 
Chaney principle to pre-enforcement monitoring activities. See, e.g., Gillis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding HHS decision not to monitor hospitals’ 
provision of reduced cost services was not reviewable); Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 
1129-31 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding HHS decision not to collect data on race disparities was not reviewable 
because committed to agency discretion). 
108.  421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
109.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832-33 (noting lack of review unless Congress “has 
provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising enforcement powers.”); see also Bachowski, 
421 U.S. at 566-68. 
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be thorough: courts regularly require agencies to provide a full explanation,110 
including how the agency assessed the importance of specific considerations111 
or why it departed from prior practice.112 At least in the relatively few pockets 
of the federal code where an agency’s organic statute presents the requisite 
mandate-plus-standards, a court can require an agency to explain the structure 
or even the precise specification of an algorithmic enforcement tool.113 
The remaining exceptions, however, are narrower and offer only weak and 
irregular prospects of rebutting Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. One 
exception triggers when an agency has adopted a policy of nonenforcement that 
rises to the level of an “abdication” of its statutory responsibilities.114 Note, 
however, that this is not typically a free-standing exception. Rather, instances 
of abdication are reviewable only because the statute, in commanding that an 
agency safeguard the public health or safety, might thereby indicate that the 
agency lacks discretion to adopt a wholesale policy of nonenforcement.115 The 
focus, as in Dunlop, remains on whether there are sufficient indicia of 
legislative intent to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability. Moreover, 
courts have been reluctant to find abdication in cases where the agency is 
 
110.  See, e.g., Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 905 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(“Until the Board explains itself, we have no way of reviewing the Board’s actions for consistency or 
rationality and no way of keeping our own precedents in harmony.”); United States Dep’t of Def. v. 
FLRA, 982 F.2d 577, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Because the record and the FLRA’s explanation for its 
decision are insufficient to support judicial review, the case is remanded to FLRA.”). 
111.  See, e.g., Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 952 F.2d 555, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 
Charlottesville v. FERC, 661 F.2d 945, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1981); City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
FHLBB, 600 F.2d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 1979); City Nat’l Bank v. Smith, 513 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
112.  See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 
809 (1973) (“[I]t is enough to satisfy the requirements of judicial oversight of administrative action if 
the agency asserts distinctions that, when fairly and sympathetically read in the context of the entire 
opinion of the agency, reveal the policies it is pursuing.”); Phila. Gas Works v. FERC, 989 F.2d 1246, 
1247 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Of course, FERC can consider new facts and circumstances to limit North 
Penn and is entitled to weigh ‘equitable’ considerations as it thinks appropriate. But it must identify the 
facts, circumstances, and equitable factors on which it relies.”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 
652, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that FERC must 
provide “a reasoned explanation for any . . . failure to adhere to its own precedents”). 
113.  That said, some courts have questioned how much proprietary information 
agencies might be required to disclose. A good example is Corner v. Harris, 519 F. App’x 942, 943 (7th 
Cir. 2013), a case challenging agency non-enforcement under the Labor–Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, which requires the secretary to “file suit if there is probable cause to believe that a 
violation of federal law probably affected the outcome of the election.” Id. at 943. In declining to 
compel enforcement, the court there noted that “even federal statutes that, unlike § 402, create 
enforceable rights of access to information, have exceptions for material gathered in the course of pre-
litigation investigations.” Id. And it reasoned that “Bachowski was clear that the Secretary must 
give reasons, not open the agency’s files to disclose whatever evidence the complainant desires to see.” 
Id. After all, a “prosecutor (the Secretary occupies a prosecutorial role) needs to be able to promise 
confidentiality in order to gather information—especially when there is a deadline that may prevent 
resort to compulsory process.” Id. 
114.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.  
115.  See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the court could find abdication “only if [the NRC] has established a policy not to protect . . . 
public health and safety,” and foreclosing such a finding by listing the various measures the NRC took 
to that end). 
09. ENGSTROM  HO ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/30/2020 8:36 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:800 2020 
832 
engaged in at least some enforcement activity.116 So long as an algorithmic tool 
does not foreclose enforcement entirely, and merely pares down the universe of 
targets, the exception is not typically triggered. 
A creative route around Chaney would exploit a possible ambiguity in the 
case’s normative foundation. Beyond Chaney’s separation-of-powers framing 
of enforcement as a core executive responsibility,117 the doctrine is generally 
understood to be driven by the complexity and technical nature of enforcement 
decisions.118 A key question is whether this focus on complexity sounds in 
deference or indeterminacy. At the core of a deference-based reading is 
comparative expertise: generalist judges should not second-guess expert 
administrators on how best to achieve regulatory goals, particularly where that 
determination turns on the optimal allocation of scarce agency resources.119 
That reading enjoys substantial support in Chaney itself,120 and it is hard to see 
 
116.  See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 892 F.3d 434, 440 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“CREW cites this footnote but its own submissions 
show that the Commission routinely enforces the election law violations alleged in CREW’s 
administrative complaint.”); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., No. 96-5881, 1998 WL 113802, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 
1999) (declining to entertain “broad-gauged review of HUD’s entire agency-initiated enforcement 
program (or lack thereof), sought prior to any apparent recourse by plaintiffs to the privately-initiated 
administrative enforcement schemes”). 
117.  A further normative foundation is the idea, however sound, that agency inaction 
is not as coercive an exercise of state power as agency action. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 252 
F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 675 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (declining to carve “reviewable legal rulings out from the middle of non-reviewable 
actions”). Courts have found normative foundations in other places as well, looking to pragmatic factors 
such as “the need for judicial supervision to safeguard the interests of the plaintiffs; the impact of review 
on the effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its congressionally assigned role; and the 
appropriateness of the issues raised for judicial review.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 
1970)); see also Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
118.  See Baltimore Gas & Electric, 252 F.3d at 459. In addition to the above 
discussion, complexity and technicality can mean many things. One commonly cited discussion is Judge 
Oakes concurrence in Dina v. Attorney General of United States, 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1986), 
which notes that nonreviewability is determined primarily by the fact that it is “hard to review” cases 
without appropriate guidance. See Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(citing Dina as authority for this proposition). For this reason, Judge Oakes rejects the notion that it 
applies to a relatively narrow category of cases. Of course, this justification also sounds in comparative 
expertise. See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 227 (D.D.C. 2018), adhered to on denial of 
reconsideration, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018). Note that comparative expertise will not always 
carry the day when the below-mentioned considerations are present. See, e.g., Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 
61, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (declining to apply Chaney where an agency’s decision involves a “complicated 
balancing of factors,” but where the agency was exercising its “coercive power”). 
119.  It is also the case that an agency may pursue multiple goals simultaneously, such 
as maximizing its win rate, maximizing the total amount of fines or other sanctions, or achieving what 
the agency sees as an optimal, or congressionally specified, level of enforcement effort or deterrence. 
See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ 
Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1703 (2013) 
(noting different agency objective functions and “maximands” when engaged in enforcement-related 
decision making).  
120.  As the Chaney Court itself noted, an agency’s enforcement decision “involves a 
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [agency] expertise,” Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985), making the agency “far better equipped than the courts to deal 
with the many variables involved in the proper order of its priorities.” Id. at 831-32.  
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how an agency’s use of an algorithmic tool to optimize its allocation of scarce 
resources could disturb this principle. But the picture is different if Chaney 
instead sounds in indeterminacy—that is, whether the precise grounds for 
agency non-enforcement decisions are knowable at all, and thus whether 
anyone, expert or otherwise, can reliably reconstruct the agency’s decision in a 
particular case. This alternative reading also draws support in Chaney in a key 
passage where the Court contrasts affirmative agency action, which provides “a 
focus for judicial review,” with agency failures to act, which often do not.121 
Interestingly, recentering Chaney around indeterminacy could lead courts 
in either direction on reviewability. On one hand, algorithmic tools must 
typically specify an objective function formalizing the agency’s priorities. This 
can potentially convert a line-level enforcer’s opaque, all-things-considered 
weighing of factors into a rule-bound and tractable calculus, providing the focal 
point and foothold for judicial review found missing in Chaney. On the other 
hand, a complex NLP-based machine learning tool of the sort the SEC utilizes 
may, because of technical opacity, be more indeterminate than even the efforts 
of line-level enforcement staff to work up cases in the analog way using a 
multi-factor protocol or other guidance document. The result seems 
paradoxical: algorithmic tools that are more intelligible are subject to review, 
those that are less so, or even fully opaque, are insulated from it. We offer a 
fuller discussion of questions arising from the dynamic and adaptive nature of 
certain machine learning tools below. 
Finally, lower courts have entertained still other innovative paths around 
Chaney. First, some courts have held that an agency can, by adopting a policy 
statement or formal or informal guidelines imposing binding limitations on the 
exercise of its own enforcement discretion, provide the necessary law against 
which to measure its failure to initiate enforcement.122 Other courts, however, 
have expressed skepticism as to whether a mere policy statement, as opposed to 
a properly promulgated legislative rule, can provide the necessary law to 
apply.123 This latter position, it should be noted, would permit review of agency 
use of algorithmic enforcement tools only in situations in which the tool has 
already been subject to ventilation via notice and comment and so might not 
appreciably increase accountability. Second, lower courts have worked around 
Chaney by casting an agency’s enforcement decision as a general policy or rule 
rather than a particularized action, especially when it involves the application 
of a “permanent standard” or a rule that is “mechanical” in form.124 There may, 
 
121.  Id. at 832; see also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(reasoning that deferred agency action is “affirmative agency action” because it confers lawful presence 
and employment authorization on a large class of people who would otherwise be removable).  
122.  GoJet Airlines v. FAA, 743 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2014); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 
208 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2000); Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1987).  
123.  See Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 852 
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988).  
124.  Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding a policy 
statement reviewable on this basis); see also Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996); 
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however, be limits to this logic: the Supreme Court has pointedly rejected 
judicial review proceedings that level a “broad programmatic attack” at an 
agency’s administration of its statute or otherwise seek “wholesale 
improvement” of an agency’s programmatic activities rather than focusing on 
particular agency actions that cause particularized harm.125 Note as well that 
treating an algorithm as a rule in order to take the case outside Chaney’s ambit 
raises further and distinct questions of reviewability, particularly the 
availability of pre-enforcement review. The possibility that an algorithmic 
enforcement tool constitutes a rule, with all that such a designation would entail 
under the APA, is taken up more fully below. 
Future research can and should parse this dense web of case law more 
deeply.126 For now, however, it seems safe to conclude that, save situations in 
which the mandatory framing of an agency’s organic statute brings it within 
Dunlop’s domain, or a judicial willingness to recenter Chaney around agency 
self-cabining or indeterminacy, agency use of algorithmic enforcement tools 
will remain substantially insulated from judicial challenges by regulatory 
beneficiaries or other non-targets seeking to compel agency enforcement. 
b) Regulatory Targets—Challenging Agency Enforcement 
Chaney’s presumption against reviewability is flipped when judicial 
review of an algorithmic enforcement tool is sought by an enforcement target 
itself.127 But even here, current administrative law erects substantial 
reviewability barriers that block the most likely avenues for judicial challenge, 
foiling anything resembling systematic review. 
 
Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Chaney is of no assistance to the [agency] in this 
case because the [agency’s] promulgation of a standard for ‘substantial compliance’ under the [Act] 
does not represent an enforcement action.”); Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 496 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“OPM’s decision to develop some but not other competitive examinations, in contrast, 
is a major policy decision, quite different from day-to-day agency nonenforcement decisions, or in its 
own context, from day-to-day personnel management decisions.”); Capital Area Immigrant’s Rights 
Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 264 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (declining to apply 
Chaney where “plaintiffs do not challenge any individual decision or agency enforcement action,” but 
rather “general procedures for adjudicating immigration appeals”); see also Regents of the Univ. of 
California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 499 n.13 (9th Cir. 2018); OSG Bulk Ships v. 
United States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Crowley Caribbean Transp. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 
674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1994). To that extent, courts may be picking up on a point legal academics have made 
that enforcement occupies a kind of nether-space between rulemaking, which is typically general and 
prospective in form, and adjudication, which is individualized and retroactive in form. See Lemos, supra 
note 47, at 933 (noting that enforcement shares features of both – and involves both wholesale and retail 
decisions). 
125.  See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); Lujan v. 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990). For an argument that administrative unduly forestalls 
challenges to agency failures of “systemic administration,” see Metzger, supra note 86. 
126.  See Engstrom et al., supra note 82. 
127.  See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) 
(noting strong presumption in favor of reviewability of “final agency action by an aggrieved person . . . 
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress”); see also Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (articulating strong presumption of reviewability 
of final agency action under the APA). 
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The main barrier extends from the Supreme Court’s holding in Standard 
Oil of California v. FTC that an agency’s decision to proceed with an 
enforcement action—that is, its decision to initiate an investigation, audit, or 
enforcement action—is non-final agency action and so not immediately 
challengeable.128 In a key passage, the Court distinguished an agency’s 
issuance of a complaint from the final rule at issue in Abbott Laboratories on 
the grounds that, in the latter, the FDA’s rule had a substantial legal and 
practical effect on publicity-vulnerable pharmaceutical companies, who would 
otherwise, as the Court noted, be put to the Hobson’s choice of costly 
compliance or a potentially ruinous public enforcement action. By contrast, the 
FTC’s initiation of a complaint against Standard Oil had no similar impacts 
“other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation.”129 Litigation 
costs, as the Court had put it several decades earlier, are “part of the social 
burden of living under government.”130 
For regulatory targets who seek to challenge an agency’s use of an 
algorithmic enforcement tool, several implications follow. To begin, an 
enforcement target that believes it has been wrongly or arbitrarily identified by 
an algorithmic tool for investigation, audit, or enforcement cannot seek review 
of that decision on an interlocutory basis and instead must wait until the agency 
has brought its enforcement action to a conclusion.131 At that point, a 
regulatory target that has mounted an unsuccessful defense, and thus found 
liable, could attempt to argue that even an agency enforcement action that is 
unassailable as a substantive matter is nonetheless voidable where the agency’s 
process—including an upstream algorithmic process used to identify it as a 
regulatory target at the outset—was inconsistent with the agency’s organic 
statute or implementing regulations. The APA specifically contemplates such 
actions via § 704’s decree that a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate 
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the 
review of the final agency action.”132 
However, practical barriers remain. In cases in which the regulatory target 
was wrongly accused, the question of the propriety of the upstream use of the 
algorithm will, as a practical matter, merge with the substantive liability 
 
128.  FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). 
129.  Id. at 243. 
130.  Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938). 
Around the time of Standard Oil, the Court reiterated: “Mere litigation expense, even substantial and 
unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing 
Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). At other times, the Court has paid lip service to the notion that being 
targeted for investigation or other enforcement action is costly. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 
238, 249 (1980) (noting that enforcement decisions can “result in significant burdens on a defendant or a 
statutory beneficiary, even if he is ultimately vindicated”). But the Court has never suggested that these 
costs are legally cognizable.  
131.  The analogy to interlocutory review is an apt one, as the Standard Oil Court 
noted: because an agency’s issuance of a complaint will ultimately merge with an eventual decision on 
the merits, it would not qualify for interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. Standard Oil, 
449 U.S. at 246.  
132.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). 
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question. Moreover, Standard Oil’s rejection of litigation costs as cognizable 
legal injury negates any possible recourse other than reversal on liability.133 As 
a result, it is only cases in which a court upholds the agency’s finding of 
substantive liability that will proceed to the question of the propriety of the 
agency’s upstream use of the algorithm. But here, given Standard Oil’s clear 
rejection of litigation costs as a legally cognizable injury, a finding that the 
agency used an illegitimate means to reach a legitimate end can be dismissed as 
harmless error or would not provide grounds for recovery of damages. In short, 
neither scenario is likely to yield systematic review of an agency’s algorithmic 
enforcement toolkit. 
*   *   * 
In short, conventional ex post judicial review of agency action under the 
APA is unlikely to generate systematic or even consistent review of the 
government’s new algorithmic toolkit in either the enforcement or adjudication 
context. 
C. Current Administrative Law: The Limits of Ex Ante Review 
Another potential avenue for challenging agency use of algorithmic tools 
lies in characterizing the adoption of AI as a rule instead of a step in the 
adjudicatory or enforcement process. This path opens up two further potential 
mechanisms of accountability. One is the APA’s requirement that “legislative” 
rules be subjected to notice and comment, which could apply to algorithms 
used for adjudication or enforcement. The other is pre-enforcement judicial 
review of an algorithmic tool in the enforcement context more specifically, 
before the tool is applied in a particular case and without the necessity of a 
violation. As with conventional ex post judicial review of agency action, 
however, these mechanisms still amount to a patchwork of accountability under 
current administrative law. 
1. Algorithms as Legislative Rules Requiring Notice and Comment 
A cornerstone of the APA’s accountability regime is the requirement that 
“legislative” rules must be ventilated via notice and comment. That process 
requires that an agency explain what a proposed regulation is designed to 
achieve, solicit comments from interested parties, “consider[] . . . the relevant 
matter presented,” and provide a “concise general statement of th[e] basis and 
 
133.  Other potential avenues of recourse are likewise unavailable. For instance, the 
Federal Tort Claims Act specifically withholds the Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for 
malicious prosecution or abuse of process claims, carving out “[a]ny claim based upon an act or 
omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 
(2018). This removes any possibility of common-law remedies. 
09. ENGSTROM  HO ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/30/2020 8:36 AM 
Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State 
837 
purpose” of the rule.134 As a practical matter, the “concise general statement” is 
often neither concise nor general due to judicial scrutiny under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard. 
Not all rules,135 however, qualify as legislative in nature. Lower courts 
have worked out a complicated doctrinal structure for sifting agency 
pronouncements that deserve the “legislative” label from those that are mere 
policy statements, rules of agency procedure or practice, or interpretative rules 
clarifying an agency’s prior regulations.136 Painting with a broad brush, these 
line-drawings variously distill to: (i) whether the rule has a binding effect on 
the agency, particularly line-level staff,137 (ii) whether the rule substantially 
alters the rights and interests of regulated parties,138 and (iii) the amount of 
regulatory work the rule does relative to the governing statute or prior agency-
promulgated rules.139 The resulting tangle of doctrines has been described as 
“tenuous,” “blurred,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in considerable smog.”140 
These characterizations alone may be enough to establish that notice and 
comment is unlikely to provide a systematic source of accountability, but a 
brief examination of cases implementing the tests helps drive home the point. 
As just one example, the extent to which an algorithm binds will turn in 
significant part on the degree to which there is a human in the loop—a question 
that is itself a highly subjective one and also likely to change with informal 
shifts in agency practice. But courts regularly characterize policies as 
legislative rules, even where substantial discretion remains with the agency and 
its line-level prosecutors.141 An illustrative case is McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. 
v. Thomas,142 where the court had to characterize a model used by the EPA to 
predict a company’s levels of hazardous waste. The EPA argued that the model 
was not subject to notice and comment rulemaking because it was “not solely 
determinative of EPA’s action” and was instead “one of many tools” used. 
Despite finding that the rule was “not ironclad” and that it in fact permitted 
exercise of agency discretion, the court found the model, upon close review, to 
 
134.  5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018). 
135.  The APA capaciously defines a rule as “an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or 
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.” See id. § 551(4). 
136.  An agency might also claim that a rule is exempt from notice and comment 
under the APA’s good cause exemption. See id. § 553(d)(2). 
137.  Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
138.  Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The most 
important factor concerns the actual legal effect (or lack thereof) of the agency action in question on 
regulated entities.”). 
139.  Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
140.  Community Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 946. 
141.  See, e.g., Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (describing a legislative rule as a rule which “narrowly limits administrative 
discretion”). 
142.  838 F.2d 1317, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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be a legislative rule requiring notice and comment.143 Other courts, however, 
refuse to apply a legislative label even where an agency pronouncement leaves 
no discretion at all. For instance, the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the 
legislative label to a series of agreements the EPA entered into with animal 
feeding operations in which the EPA promised not to bring enforcement actions 
pending the development of a methodology for measuring emissions.144 
Despite what amounted to a total cabining of enforcement discretion, the court 
reasoned that a narrow focus on discretion would extend the rule to nearly 
every consent agreement between an agency and a regulated entity.145 
Against this uncertain backdrop, consider the SSA’s expedited grant 
process (QDD). Recall that the adoption of QDD in fact went through notice 
and comment, because it required amendment of existing procedural rules.146 
Yet whether the proposal provided sufficient notice of the algorithmic decision 
tool is unclear.147 SSA stated that the “predictive model . . . will score claims 
by taking into account such factors as medical history, treatment protocols, and 
medical signs and findings.”148 Claims would be subject to QDD if the model 
found a “high degree of probability” of a disability. No more detail was 
provided. On the one hand, key aspects of the model would seem to fit under 
the legislative rule rubric: the probability threshold would bind lower level 
officials (in the sense of removing cases from standard review to the QDD 
team) and a quick grant “substantially alter[s] the rights and interests” of 
regulated parties in light of the counterfactual delay of receipt of benefits.149 
On the other hand, discretion would still rest (a) in the QDD review team to 
decide a recommended quick grant, and (b) in adjudicators for all other cases. 
And one might argue that, despite the value of an earlier benefits determination, 
there is no alteration of rights in the sense that eligibility criteria are unchanged 
and claimants may receive backdated benefits payments if ultimately found 
eligible. In that sense, the QDD adoption resembles the medical-vocational 
guidelines (sometimes referred to as “the grid”), replacing case-by-case 
vocational expert judgment. The grid still allowed ALJs to deviate under 
certain circumstances, but were promulgated via notice and comment.150 Under 
current administrative law, it is unclear whether SSA should have provided 
greater clarity about the QDD algorithm, but such operational details are 
critical to understanding its impact on the rights of beneficiaries. 
 
143.  Id. at 1319-23. 
144.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
145.  Id. 
146.  United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Ariz. 
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).  
147.  K.W. ex rel. D.W. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding notice 
lacking when the statistical budget calculation was altered).  
148.  Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 
Fed. Reg. 16,430 (Mar. 31, 2006).  
149.  See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
150.  See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n.5 (1983).  
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Finally, requiring notice and comment for all algorithmic tools would be 
suboptimal. As we have shown above, the range of algorithmic decision tools is 
considerable. The SSA tool profiled previously that clusters cases for 
processing falls much more squarely within the ambit of a rule of internal 
agency organization, and there is nothing about the use of unsupervised 
learning in that setting that mandates notice and comment.151 Moreover, our 
research into agency adoption of AI confirms that there is a considerable gap 
between private and public sector innovation. Notice and comment is a 
protracted process and, when combined with pre-enforcement review, can 
stymie innovation and prevent dynamic government responses to a changing 
policy problem or regulatory landscape. The use of technology itself is not a 
per se indicator of the kind of rule that necessitates notice and comment. 
2. Algorithms and Pre-Enforcement Review 
Pre-enforcement review of agency rules is available if a litigant can meet 
the familiar two-pronged test of fitness for judicial resolution and hardship.152 
Fitness is determined by whether the disputed claims raise a purely legal 
question and also the finality of the agency’s decision, defined as whether the 
rule is the consummation of an agency process from which legal consequences 
will flow.153 Hardship boils down to whether a rule’s impact is sufficiently 
direct and immediate, which in turn asks whether the rule requires an 
immediate and significant change in the plaintiff’s conduct of affairs with 
substantial penalties for noncompliance or otherwise imposes an injury that 
cannot be remedied upon review of an individual action.154 
Some parts of the fitness inquiry do not pose a barrier to pre-enforcement 
review of algorithmic tools of the sort deployed by the SSA and SEC. So long 
as an agency’s use of an algorithmic tool has advanced beyond the pilot stage, 
it plainly represents a final and settled agency position. Likewise, an agency’s 
potential initiation of an enforcement action plainly rises to the level of a legal 
consequence. Whether an algorithm’s propriety is a purely legal question, 
however, is a closer question. On one view, the output of an algorithmic tool is 
a prediction as to an ultimate legal outcome—for the SSA, whether a disability 
benefits case is a likely grant, or for the SEC, whether a broker is likely to be 
violating the securities laws. Facts serve solely as model inputs—the data 
features that drive the model—in generating that conclusion. Given this, the 
most common question upon review of an algorithmic tool—whether the tool’s 
legal predictions fit within the substantive law that governs the agency’s 
action—entails a purely legal comparison of the encoded, algorithmic rule and 
 
151.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018) (exempting from notice and comment “rules 
of agency organization, procedure, or practice”). 
152.  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).  
153.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
154.  Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. 136. 
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the statute’s substantive liability standard. If, by contrast, the propriety of the 
rule turns on details of its bureaucratic implementation—for instance, the 
degree to which front-line enforcement or adjudicatory staff rely on it, and thus 
the extent to which a human remains “in the loop”—then the question is likely 
one of mixed law and fact, thus undermining the required fitness showing. 
Other contours of the doctrine deepen the risk of a checkerboard of 
accountability. For instance, the hardship question as articulated by the Court in 
the Abbott Labs/Toilet Goods duo makes industry characteristics, not features 
of the rule itself, the most salient part of the analysis.155 Algorithmic tools used 
to regulate the publicity-sensitive pharmaceutical industry will be more 
reviewable than tools used to regulate other industries. Still more variation in 
accountability is likely to arise out of the fierce debate among lower courts 
about whether ripeness doctrine should permit pre-enforcement challenges to 
non-legislative guidance documents156 and procedural rules.157 Several courts, 
for instance, have held that procedural challenges to policy pronouncements 
that were not promulgated as rules must await an agency effort to enforce the 
policy.158 The famously blurry line dividing legislative rules and other types of 
agency pronouncements adds another way in which some algorithmic tools will 
qualify for pre-enforcement review while others will not. 
D. The Informational Challenges of Conventional APA Review 
Even if an algorithm were subjected to judicial review or notice and 
comment, substantial informational barriers impede review of algorithmic 
decision tools. The existing algorithmic accountability literature, we noted 
previously (in Section II.A), has begun to sketch an account of the regulatory 
challenges posed by the technical opacity of more sophisticated algorithmic 
tools. But Part I’s concrete consideration of the technical and operational 
details of specific algorithmic governance tools, when combined with an 
understanding of the current landscape of administrative law, brings into relief 
a more concrete set of accountability challenges that go well beyond standard 
concerns about technical opacity. 
 
155.  For instance, the result in Abbott Labs arguably turns on the unique public 
relations vulnerability of a pharmaceutical company facing an FDA enforcement action. 
156.  Generally speaking, guidance documents are not open to pre-enforcement 
review. See Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810 (2003) (policy statement not 
ripe); Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (interpretative rule held 
not ripe.); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (policy statement not ripe); see 
also First Nat. Bank of Chi. v. Comptroller of Currency of U.S., 956 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 830 (1992). However, there are exceptions. A leading case is Aviators for Safe & 
Fairer Regulation, Inc. v. FAA, 221 F.3d 222, 225 (1st Cir. 2000). There, the court found that where a 
notice was “final in a procedural sense,” it could be ripe for pre-enforcement review. Id. This conclusion 
turned on the same ripeness analysis advanced in Abbott Labs. 387 U.S. at 148-49. It’s sensible to think 
a similar approach could be taken towards the adoption of a new artificial intelligence program. 
157.  Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1992). 
158.  Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679, 681-82 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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First, public sector AI use implicates a different set of legal frameworks 
than applies to purely private sector use, occluding access to the technical and 
operational details of their use. For instance, when agencies have contracted 
with third parties to provide algorithmic governance tools, code and other 
technical details may be protected by the same patent, copyright, or trade 
secrecy rules that apply in the private sector context. Government use provides 
it no further right to distribute code.159 When produced in-house, however, 
code may instead be protected under FOIA’s law enforcement or trade secrecy 
exemptions.160 And when produced in-house for adjudication, the status of such 
software remains unclear. Some agencies affirmatively exclude software in 
their FOIA implementing regulations.161 Others, like the U.S. Digital Service, 
have open sourced their code. Even when code is available, however, parties 
may be unable to understand how the algorithm works in practice, or fully 
identify errors and bias, without access to underlying data. A facial recognition 
model, for instance, may appear flawless in code, but gender and racial 
disparities can emanate from training data that underrepresent individuals with 
darker complexion.162 Yet in many agency domains, the underlying training 
data cannot be fully disclosed by law. In the SSA context, individual data is 
protected under the Privacy Act of 1974.163 And in the SEC context, while raw 
disclosures are available, data from prior investigations used in supervised 
learning models (e.g., which filings triggered elevated review) is likely 
protected under FOIA’s exemption for law enforcement purposes. 
Second, even if data and code were made available, courts performing 
judicial review of the APA sort remain poorly situated to review the accuracy 
of the machine learning model as a whole. As a preliminary matter, litigants 
typically seek to remedy the specific error in their case. A court might therefore 
find that the algorithm wrongly flagged a benefits applicant as undeserving and 
order the agency to correct the error. But it is much harder to probe and provide 
a remedy for systematic sources of algorithmic error within the confines of a 
single APA challenge. Consider the case of Ledgerwood v. Arkansas 
Department of Public Health,164 where Medicaid recipients challenged the 
method of allocating caregiver hours to recipients with disabilities under state 
law. Prior to 2015, nurses assessed individual need to assign caregiver hours. 
After publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking to merge two programs, the 
state switched to deploying an algorithm to assess needs. In 2018, a state trial 
 
159.  48 C.F.R. § 12.212 (2019).  
160.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (7) (2018). 
161.  See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 291.3(b)(2)(ii) (2020) (“Normally, computer software, 
including source code, object code, and listings of source and object codes, regardless of medium are not 
agency records.”).  
162.  Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, CONF. FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & 
TRANSPARENCY 77 (2018).  
163.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018). 
164.  Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336 (Ark. 2017). 
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court found that the failure to notify individuals of the algorithmic change was 
a statutory violation. The legal aid attorney Kevin De Liban obtained the 
algorithm in a twenty-one-page printout, making it extremely difficult to 
scrutinize. While the court enjoined the agency from using the algorithm, it 
resorted to relying on the procedural defect of failure to notify parties of the 
algorithmic change. This move reflects the lack of capacity of courts and 
litigants to engage with such tools. To be sure, expert witnesses could be hired, 
but, as Ledgerwood illustrates, this would likely have substantial distributive 
effects on what kind of errors can be corrected. 
Third, data and algorithms may change dynamically, particularly in the 
enforcement context. Consider the SEC’s supervised learning model for Form 
ADV disclosures. The model is trained on past referrals to the SEC’s 
enforcement arm, but the set of referrals grows over time, with different forms 
of human input for each referral. This means that each model might be distinct, 
so that the model reviewed at one stage (notice and comment) may already be 
substantively quite different when deployed. Conversely, problematic 
predictions at one point (the initiation of a specific enforcement action) might 
vanish as the model is updated. These challenges become more acute as 
agencies adopt more advanced forms of machine learning that are dynamic in 
nature (e.g., active learning or reinforcement learning). By nature, the notice-
and-comment process and APA-type challenges are static and fail to generate 
the kind of information required to understand an algorithm in action. 
Fourth, and as noted previously, even full access to source code and data 
does not necessarily achieve interpretability, particularly for more sophisticated 
models. Explainable and interpretable AI is a frontier challenge in computer 
science research. And if the engineers cannot understand it, the ability of 
parties during a sixty-day commenting period or a judge in an adversarial 
judicial proceeding will be even more limited. Compounding this problem is 
the possibility that regulated parties can deploy adversarial learning to fool 
models. Figure 3 displays a well-known example of the brittleness of prevailing 
deep learning approaches: adding seemingly random noise can fool a deep 
learning model into misclassifying an image, when both images are 
indistinguishable to human eyes. Computer scientists are actively researching 
defensive protocols, but the basic finding to date has been that it is remarkably 
easy to fool these models. 
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Figure 3. Prior published example of “adversarial learning” to fool image 
recognition model into misclassifying object.165 By adding imperceptible noise 
to an image, its classification can change from “panda” to “gibbon.” 
 
Consider an example of image similarity search piloted by the Patent and 
Trademark Office and Word Intellectual Property Organization in Figure 4. 
These models deploy state-of-the-art deep learning (convolutional neural 
networks trained on a large set of image data). The four images are the most 
similar images based on a search for the World Wildlife Fund panda logo. If 
implemented, this image similarity tool would displace the current manual 
search efforts that trademark examiners engage in, based on classification 
codes. Yet adversarial learning can fool the similarity search into failing to 
retrieve existing trademarks that are visually similar to a human, thus 
undermining the goals of the trademark system. Moreover, because well-
resourced parties are more likely to have the capacity to develop adversarial 
models, such developments could cause unwarranted disparities between the 
haves and have-nots. 
 
 
165.  Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy, Explaining and 
Harnessing Adversarial Examples (2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 [https://perma.cc/XN5P-
NB7B]. 
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Figure 4. Example of prototype trademark similarity search model.166 Images 
provide the first four search results based on a search of the World Wildlife 
Fund trademarked panda logo. 
 
Similar adversarial examples exist for NLP, where adding random text 
that results in no meaningful change for a human reader, may fool an NLP 
model into misclassifying the text. Just as in the trademark example, 
sophisticated parties may be able to develop models to fool the SEC’s NLP 
model into classifying a registrant’s disclosure as “low risk,” hence evading 
enforcement efforts. While the trademark example provides a potential 
backstop under the Lanham Act, inadvertent underenforcement due to 
adversarial learning has no easy solution—and indeed might never be 
detected—by the SEC. 
Last, even if the model is completely transparent, its usage may not be. As 
noted previously, when a line-level prosecutor retains the ultimate authority to 
initiate an enforcement action, automation may (a) displace investigative 
resources away from false negatives, and/or (b) crowd out the exercise of 
discretion with suspected positives. The result can be an idiosyncratic focus on 
a subset of violations or, worse, a runaway feedback loop. In the SEC context, 
AI tools may lead the agency to fight the last war, at the expense of spotting 
new trends in the evasion of the securities laws by sophisticated actors. In 
adjudication, formal authority for adjudicators may be functional abdication. 
Agency adjudicators face crushing caseloads and high production quotas, so the 
temptation to quickly ratify model-based predictions is high. This behavior 
might generate the appearance of improvement in the sense of higher 
consistency across adjudicators. The system might thus appear to have solved 
the problem of arbitrariness, but only because of the fiction of adjudicator 
review. 
Having canvassed the APA landscape and its applicability to concrete AI 
use cases, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the current APA mechanisms 
 
166.  Christophe Mazenc, Machine Learning Applied to Trademarks Classification 
and Search, WIPO 39 (2018), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/globalinfra/en/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18_p17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N8M9-LG5C].  
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remain ill-suited for providing meaningful accountability over rapid advances 
in AI. 
III. Regulating the New Algorithmic Governance 
This Part steps back and asks how current oversight of administrative 
action may be adapted and reformed to address the basic gaps we identified 
above. We spell out several possible reforms, ranging from a minimalist 
retrofitting of the APA to a maximalist creation of a comprehensive oversight 
board. We consider these options, as well as a middle-ground approach that 
would require agencies to engage in prospective benchmarking of AI 
governance tools, empowering agency administrator and external overseers 
alike to assess, diagnose, and correct for deviations between AI-augmented and 
human decisions. 
A. Retrofitting the APA 
Retrofitting the APA would likely entail one of two moves: subjecting 
algorithmic tools to the APA’s procedures for notice and comment and relaxing 
the APA’s limitations on reviewability in the enforcement or other contexts. 
1. Notice and Comment 
One move would be to provide greater clarification for when the adoption 
of AI constitutes a legislative rule, given the novel questions presented by AI 
use cases. We suggest several factors that may guide courts and agencies in this 
analysis. 
First, the more humans remain “in the loop,” the less notice and comment 
should be triggered. The QDD process, for instance, still ultimately leaves it to 
a QDD review team to decide whether to grant benefits for expedited cases. 
Human review, however, cannot be a mere formality. The review process 
would have to be designed to permit genuine exercise of human discretion—
e.g., the QDD review team would need sufficient time and decisional 
independence to review proposed grants. Otherwise, the adoption of AI may 
functionally bind officials and “substantially alter[] the rights and interests of 
regulated parties,” counseling in favor of notice and comment. An additional 
indicator of the extent of displacement of human discretion is the threshold for 
human review. In the enforcement context, a supervised learning algorithm that 
flags a case as “high risk” necessarily sets a (probability) threshold for the risk 
classification. The lower the threshold, the greater the chance of false positives 
and the lower the chance of false negatives. Indeed, when the threshold is zero, 
that is equivalent to using no algorithm at all; all cases would have to be 
processed by a human reviewer. The more the threshold approaches one, the 
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greater the risk that human discretion is displaced by the algorithm.167 This 
fundamental tradeoff—between false positives and false negatives—may affect 
the amount of human discretion and the optimal threshold cannot be 
determined absent a weighing of the social costs of each type of error.168 The 
proper level at which to set the threshold is precisely where public participation 
via notice and comment may be most useful. 
Second, notice-and-comment is more appropriate when AI adoption 
involves considerable distributive consequences. For instance, when QDD 
expedites benefits to a distinct demographic group, the decision presents larger 
policy questions best suited for notice and comment. How distinct are 
applicants that apply in paper form (along geography, age, race, or gender)? If 
so, is there a way to deploy resource savings from QDD to provide comparable 
benefits to these applicants? In the enforcement context, could machine 
learning inadvertently perpetuate prior enforcement priorities? These broader 
questions may benefit from notice and comment, even if the model remains at 
the development stage. For instance, research around predictive policing has 
yielded useful approaches to the runaway feedback loop: allow only new 
arrests to enter the training data when the arrest was surprising relative to the 
model.169 Here notice and comment genuinely allows agencies to secure input 
on how to design more robust AI tools. 
Third, the desirability of notice and comment of the algorithm differs for 
enforcement and adjudication. In enforcement, for the same reasons that FOIA 
exempts enforcement data, notice and comment of an algorithmic adoption may 
do more to impede than improve the tool. In contrast, there is value to 
beneficiaries of understanding the method and criteria of benefits in the 
adjudicatory context. Because the process is itself product, algorithmic changes 
matter for claimants. It would be relevant, for instance, if claimant groups 
opposed expedited grants because of the omission of hearings. The adoption of 
AI for adjudication—when it implicates hearings and decisional 
independence—should hence be more likely to be subjected to notice and 
comment. Adoption of AI may “encode[] a substantive value judgment” that 
acts as more than a mere procedural rule.170 
While these factors help to clarify when the adoption of AI should be 
subjected to notice and comment, they merely provide guidance. Specific 
applications remain far from clear. 
 
167.  This is based on the assumption that human reviewers are much less likely to 
pay attention to the large pool of predicted negatives.  
168.  For instance, in the QDD setting, a low threshold for expedited resolution may 
mean that more agency resources are diverted, therefore lengthening the decision time for non-expedited 
decisions.  
169.  Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing, 
CONFERENCE OF FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847 [https://perma.cc/4APU-N8QK]. 
170.  Air Transp. Ass’n v. Dept. of Transp., 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990), judgment 
vacated and remanded for mootness, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991).  
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2. Reviewability 
Our suggestions for reviewability are distinct across adjudication and 
enforcement. In adjudication, claimants can challenge the denial of disability 
benefits in district court. Yet jurisdiction channeling—whereby the remedy for 
an improper denial is to reverse the agency’s decision—makes it more difficult 
for claimants to challenge systematic sources of error, which are much more 
likely to be prevalent when they stem from algorithmic decisions. Due process 
counsels in favor of enabling claimants to challenge algorithmic decision tools. 
For instance, if the SSA’s Insight system fails to parse a particular functional 
impairment that is contested for a subgroup (e.g., balancing for individuals with 
chronic back pain171), litigants should be able to seek a remedy that goes 
beyond the granting of benefits, namely remedying the systematic error of the 
Insight program. 
In the enforcement context, Congress or courts may wish to relax the 
presumption against reviewability of enforcement prioritization under Heckler 
v. Chaney.172 Alternatively, liberal characterization of algorithms as rules 
combined with pre-enforcement review would potentially enable parties to 
determine when an algorithm has deviated substantially from the formal goals 
of enforcement. 
While these APA fixes would ensure greater accountability of AI tools, 
significant underenforcement against bad algorithms is likely to remain.173 
Judicialization of agency decision making also brings well-known costs, 
introducing delay, diverting scarce agency resources, and disrupting agency 
priority setting.174 
B. Mixing Ex Ante and Ex Post Review: An Oversight Board 
Given the limitations of ex ante and ex post review, an institutional 
solution might be an oversight board of AI strategy within the agency.175 
Congress could mandate this by statute or agencies could create an oversight 
board by rule. The charge to such an oversight board would be to (a) provide 
 
171.  Sara Kersnoveske, Libby Gibson & Jenny Strong, Item Validity of the Physical 
Demands from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for Functional Capacity Evaluation of Clients with 
Chronic Back Pain, 24 WORK 157, 165-66 (2003).  
172.  470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
173.  If Congress wanted to incentivize private enforcement, it could provide for 
attorney’s fees when litigation results in a correction of government AI.  
174.  Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1338 (2014) (summarizing the debate). 
175.  The natural analogy here is Inspectors General offices or, in Margo Schlanger’s 
framing, “offices of goodness” or other “ombudsman” approaches. See Margo Schlanger, Offices of 
Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014). For 
studies of IGs, many in the civil rights context, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive 
Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 256 (2006); Katyal, supra note 86, at 2347-48; and Shirin 
Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2013). 
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input for a strategic agency AI plan, (b) serve as a check for whether AI 
deployment comports with relevant law and policy (e.g., due process, 
antidiscrimination), and (c) review and issue recommendations for revising 
algorithmic decision tools. Board members could include senior agency staff in 
charge of developing the use case, the agency’s Evaluation Officer (mandated 
under the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act) or Chief Data 
Officer, academics, other stakeholders (e.g., disability rights groups, industry 
representatives), and representatives from other agencies. 
Such a board could yield several benefits. First, a board would provide 
both ex ante and ex post oversight of AI deployment, without the substantial 
costs of notice-and-comment rulemaking or a judicial challenge. Second, by 
focusing on a longer-term strategic plan, the oversight board can make 
recommendations that touch on other agency operations that can facilitate AI. 
A major limitation of SSA’s predictive modeling, for instance, is that much of 
the applicant data (e.g., previous occupation) is unstructured. Agencies have 
deployed significant resources to use NLP techniques to convert unstructured 
text into structured data, but a first order solution—one that might in fact be 
cheaper in the long run—would be to standardize inputs. 
Third, the board would pool perspectives across levels of decision making 
and agencies. Current use cases are isolated across and within agencies, and the 
board could spark new innovation by providing perspectives from outside of 
the specific office. The SEC, for instance, could benefit from an agency that 
has considered use of “generative adversarial networks” to disclose data to 
enlist outside data scientists who can bring a fresh analytic eye without 
triggering privacy concerns. At a Roundtable we convened, over twenty agency 
officials attended and expressed tremendous value in sharing knowledge from 
what are otherwise disconnected programs. One agency official, for instance, 
had developed software to carry out topic modeling for comments submitted in 
rulemakings. Another had given a great deal of thought to inviting academics 
for short-term visits to foster idea generation. A board could help pool such 
insights across comparable agencies. 
Fourth, the board could explicitly assess the potential for disparate impact. 
For instance, if there are serious concerns that expedited benefits would 
disadvantage certain demographic groups because of variations in filing 
capacity, the board could consider recommendations to level those differences. 
Fifth, the board would provide an institutional structure to determine evidence 
of adversarial learning to fool government AI tools (e.g., burying harmful 
disclosures amongst more boilerplate). Last, perhaps the most significant 
benefit of the board would be to foster a learning environment at the agency. 
The SEC represents an agency where staff were encouraged to experiment and 
fail. Many other agencies lack such a “sandbox” environment, which seriously 
impedes AI innovation within government. The board could foster such a 
culture of AI innovation within and across agencies by reducing administrative 
barriers (e.g., providing template position descriptions, developing best 
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practices for academic residencies, and publicly rewarding pilots regardless of 
result). 
That said, there are considerable costs to an oversight board, most notably 
in time, FTEs, and resources. The solution to bad bureaucracy is not necessarily 
more bureaucracy. And if the prime reason for underdevelopment of AI tools in 
the administrative state lies in resource constraints, diverting more time to a 
Board may dilute already scarce AI skillsets. To be sure, the precise size and 
composition could be tailored to address these concerns. Agencies like SSA, 
EOIR, OMHA, and BVA, for instance, have structurally very similar problems, 
and could create a common oversight board for mass adjudication. Similarly, 
the SEC, EPA, and IRS each desire to learn from rich administrative data with 
similar ideas for enforcement targeting, and could thus benefit from 
information exchange.176 Agencies may be reluctant to create such oversight 
boards, precisely for fear of airing the dirty laundry, but external perspectives 
may be important for identifying potential blind spots. Perhaps the most 
substantial limitation is that a Board may be limited in its capacity to engage 
with the operational details of these tools. Absent another mechanism for 
monitoring the impact of AI tools, the Board may have only limited 
information to support its decision. 
C. Prospective Benchmarking 
A third and less resource-intensive mechanism can generate critical 
information for accountable algorithmic adoption. We call the proposal 
“prospective benchmarking.” The core idea is that when agencies adopt an AI 
decision making tool, they should subject it to benchmarking relative to a 
random hold-out set of cases that undergo conventional human review.177 We 
conceive of benchmarking as prospective in nature as opposed to a backward-
looking evaluation of how AI changed prior decision making. Such 
retrospective evaluations are widely acknowledged to suffer from significant 
inferential challenges.178 Incorporating prospective benchmarking into 
deployment of AI systems enables agencies to more reliably learn about 
potential impact.179 What is the accuracy gain of AI adoption? Is bias affected 
 
176.  See GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM, supra note 17, at 90 (cataloging benefits of 
inter-agency collaboration). 
177.  For a somewhat similar proposal in the private sector context requiring 
companies to show they tested a new model with and without newly available data in order to gauge 
potential disparate impact, see Selbst & Barocas, supra note 89, at 1129-38. 
178.  Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 929 (2010); Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal 
Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (2011).  
179.  It bears noting that prospective benchmarking as envisioned here differs in 
important respects from a commonly advocated accountability mechanism: “algorithmic impact 
assessments.” See Directive on Automated Decision-Making, GOV’T OF CANADA (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592 [https://perma.cc/4RQE-KD45]; Dillon Reisman 
et al., Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public Agency Accountability, 
AINOW (Apr. 2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5Z6-P8T8]; 
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by AI adoption? How much time is saved? Does the algorithm engage in any 
other systematic errors relative to human review? 
The proposal starts from the basic setting that in each of the use cases 
detailed above, machine learning is beginning to displace the exercise of human 
discretion in agency decision making. And because the status quo consists of a 
fully human decision, this adoption process provides a compelling opportunity 
to benchmark the tool by leveraging the central insight of machine learning: use 
of a random hold-out (or test) set to compare outcomes between the AI-assisted 
and human (status quo) decision. In the SSA context, for instance, the Insight 
system could be deactivated for a random hold-out set and compared to 
decisions made with Insight fully activated. In the SEC context, investigators 
could be required to fully investigate cases without the aid of risk scores for a 
subset of cases, with the results then compared to algorithmically assisted case 
decisions. In the PTO context, a trademark search system could be disabled for 
a random set of trademark registration applications and the results compared to 
decisions made in reliance on the search system. Such a proposal is easy to 
implement, as the agency is already in the process of transitioning from a 
manual to an AI-assisted system. The primary cost is that a subset of decisions 
would not garner the potential benefit of the new system. 
The proposal would enable agencies, courts, and the public to 
meaningfully assess the impact of AI use cases, promoting accountability and 
transparency without the uncertainty of rulemaking, the overhead of an 
oversight board, or the inferential challenges of ex ante impact assessments. 
First, benchmarking facilitates rigorous validation of the AI tool, which is 
sorely lacking in current practice. In the enforcement context, the NLP 
application for investment advisor disclosures displaces how human 
investigator would normally read such disclosures, and we are unaware of any 
serious attempt to compare the NLP flag against an investigator’s independent 
assessment, particularly for disclosures that were not flagged.180 Even in 
instances where an agency offers evidence of performance gains, it is unclear 
how much to attribute to the deployment of AI. Consider SSA’s method to 
 
Scientific Foresight Unit, A Governance Framework for Algorithmic Accountability and Transparency, 
EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624262/EPRS_STU(2019)624262_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WCD6-4L5C]. Impact assessments call for evaluating the potential effects of 
algorithmic adoption on citizens (e.g., human rights), typically in advance of adoption. While such 
assessments can be valuable, it may also be challenging to make such predictive judgments in the 
absence of evidence of how the AI system operates in practice. Indeed, as Michael Greenstone has 
written, this is exactly the challenge facing regulatory agencies when asked to perform cost benefit 
analyses prior to the adoption of a regulation. See Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent 
Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111 (David Moss 
& John Cisternino eds., 2009). In contrast, prospective benchmarking acts like a rigorous evaluation (or 
randomized controlled trial) of the AI system itself, ensuring that the system is deployed in a way that 
facilitates evaluation of its impact. Policy advocates have called for algorithmic impact assessments to 
be renewed occasionally, and benchmarking can be conceived of as a natural extension of such goals. 
180.  GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM, supra note 17, at 26 (noting relatively weak 
validation and post-implementation testing). 
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compare processing times and error rates between branches that voluntarily 
adopt clustering and branches that refuse to adopt clustering. Nonrandom 
selection makes it impossible to disentangle the effects of microspecialization 
from the effects of a managerial change.181 Reduction in errors and processing 
times could simply have been due to a renewed managerial commitment that 
confounds the adoption of microspecialization. 
Instead, benchmarking enables decisionmakers to directly assess the 
impact of the AI tool in real time. Benchmark samples provide a comparison 
group to smoke out inaccuracies and biases. If the SEC algorithm, for instance, 
provided a high-risk estimate associated with an idiosyncratic network of 
investment advisors that was prosecuted last year, the model may perpetuate 
the effect of that network, but human reviewers would update based on the 
prior prosecution. Benchmark data would thus enable the agency to assess the 
impact of the AI tool, including where the model might perform poorly, 
whether the formal “human-in-the-loop” functionally ensures human oversight, 
and whether there is presence of “automation bias.” 
Second, ongoing benchmark data would provide invaluable information 
for calibrating and updating machine learning models. If adjudicators, 
investigators, claimants, and regulated parties change over time or due to 
different circumstances (known as “temporal drift” or “domain drift”), a model 
trained on a random retrospective test sample may not generalize 
prospectively.182 Similarly, benchmark data would enable understanding when 
adversarial learning by regulated parties might invalidate historical models.183 
Data emerging from the benchmarked sample would provide the information to 
update models based on such state changes or to account for such adversarial 
behavior. 
Third, benchmarking may be particularly valuable in instances where the 
government has contracted for AI services. In those instances, the government 
may not have access to technical details, but benchmark data can provide a 
performance standard to which an AI system developed by a contractor must 
adhere. 
Last, the benchmarking process ensures that agency officials retain the 
resident expertise required to process cases. One particular concern might be 
that overreliance on AI systems could hollow out the expertise to tailor and 
adapt the regulatory scheme to changing context. By requiring a critical mass 
of human reviewers to maintain the workflow, agencies ensure that such 
hollowing does not occur. 
 
181.  See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Sam Sherman & Phil Wyman, Do Checklists Make a 
Difference? A Natural Experiment from Food Safety Enforcement, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 
(2018).  
182.  Gerhard Widmer & Miroslav Kubat, Learning in the Presence of Concept Drift 
and Hidden Contexts, 23 MACHINE LEARNING 69 (1996). 
183.  Nilesh Dalvi et al., Adversarial Classification, PROC. 10TH ACM SIGKDD INT’L 
CONF. KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 99 (2004).  
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The benefits of benchmarking become clear in contrast to retrofitting the 
APA or review by an oversight board. Ex ante examination via notice and 
comment will be unable to capture an algorithm’s operational performance, 
which is particularly important given the dynamic nature of machine learning. 
Ex post judicial review or review by an oversight board would have access to a 
record of decision making, but would still fall short on understanding the 
impact of the algorithmic decision tool relative to the counterfactual of human 
decision making. 
That said, benchmarking does have weaknesses and tradeoffs. Even if 
human reviewers are blinded from algorithmic determinations in their test 
sample, their judgments may be affected by the AI system. If adjudicators 
trained on the Insight system, for instance, adapt by focusing on the specific 
quality flags thrown by the system, their manual review may fail to catch errors 
that are not programmed into the Insight system. As a result, high 
correspondence between automated and human review may not represent the 
actual risks of the automated system, undercutting the utility of benchmarking. 
This weakness may be overcome by ensuring that individuals with substantial 
experience prior to the adoption of the AI system participate in the 
benchmarking team. 
Another concern is that mandatory human review could potentially 
diminish the benefits of AI adoption. If the AI system works, some might 
argue, we should require its usage across the board instead of reserving a 
sample for human review. While this reservation is most forceful for strongly 
validated technology, the question at the heart of AI adoption in the 
administrative state is about its potential effects, biases, and unanticipated 
performance. Because ex ante algorithmic impact assessments will necessarily 
be faced with uncertainty, benchmarking provides the critical epistemic benefit 
of enabling us to assess whether the AI system works as intended. 
A final concern is that human reviewers may face conflicts of interest if 
they themselves have preferences, positive or negative, regarding the AI 
system. If there is general resistance to AI adoption, say because of fear of job 
security, reviewers may have an incentive to overinvest in identifying issues 
that the AI system cannot detect, making such human performance 
unrepresentative of conventional human processing. Conversely, if reviewers 
favor AI adoption, they may either underperform—or perform exactly as they 
would expect the AI system to perform—to make the automated system appear 
to be effective. While such perverse incentives are harder to address, at least 
two responses follow. One is that “overperformance” may actually be desirable. 
If SSA adjudicators become much more exhaustive in their benchmark review, 
AI adoption may feed a process of continuous improvement, enabling the AI 
system to better detect errors going forward. In computer science terms, 
humans might best be allocated to “explore” for novel fact patterns and 
machine learning systems may best be allocated to “exploit” known patterns by 
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scaling solutions.184 Another response is that conducting these reviews in teams 
may make it much less likely that reviewers will “throw” the review. Staffing 
reviews in this fashion can effectively turn them into peer reviews that set the 
gold standard for how cases should be handled.185 
In short, while there are certainly limitations to the benchmarking idea, 
the approach is likely to provide critical information for algorithmic 
accountability that ex ante impact assessments and ex post evaluations cannot 
provide. 
How might such prospective benchmarking come about? First, Congress 
could statutorily promote benchmarking, either by mandating its use by 
agencies or, alternatively, by prescribing or increasing judicial deference to 
agency decisions supported by satisfactorily benchmarked algorithmic systems. 
Second, courts could find agency decisions made using AI systems without 
benchmarking to be arbitrary and capricious upon conventional APA review. 
Note, however, that this assumes that plaintiffs invoking judicial review of 
agency action can surmount the reviewability and other barriers detailed in Part 
II. Third, the President could mandate benchmarking by way of executive 
order. Last, agencies themselves could institute such benchmarking of their 
own accord. Indeed, benchmarking has a close analogue to “quality 
improvement” initiatives or audits, as prescribed by the Government 
Performance and Results Act, that review a random sample of cases to 
calculate performance metrics. That said, current practices do not inspire much 
confidence in the latter path. Agencies have little incentive to monitor when an 
AI solution has gone wrong, as the incentive may be to tout successes.186 
We acknowledge that many details of benchmarking remain to be worked 
out. At what intervals should benchmarking be conducted beyond initial 
adoption? How much hold-out data is necessary? How should the review 
process be staffed? Who will make decisions about revising, updating, or even 
decommissioning a tool? Over time, the benchmarking system will ideally 
converge on a set of best practices in answer to these and other questions. In the 
meantime, and regardless of the precise vehicle by which benchmarking is 
implemented, the approach holds significant promise because it amounts to 
good machine learning and good governance, with substantially less overhead 
than alternatives. It provides a feasible and rigorous way to hold AI decision 
tools accountable, to increase transparency around their adoption, and to ensure 
that agencies themselves can ensure internal due process around their adoption. 
 
184.  Robert C. Wilson, Humans Use Directed and Random Exploration to Solve the 
Explore–Exploit Dilemma, 143 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. GEN. 2074 (2014). 
185.  See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
186.  See, e.g., Ho et al., Quality Review, supra note 15. 
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Conclusion 
In this article, we have provided rich case studies of frontier deployments 
of AI in the federal government emerging out of a major study for ACUS. As 
these case studies show, AI is increasingly moving to the center of 
administrative governance. Yet conventional proposals have not seriously 
grappled with the body of law that is most likely to negotiate the collision of 
technology and the administrative state. We have argued that conventional 
administrative law is ill-equipped for this challenge and that serious rethinking 
is in order to preserve principles of transparency and reasoned decision making. 
Our benchmarking proposal is by no means a full governance approach, but it 
is a simple, powerful, and eminently achievable approach. 
Will the new algorithmic toolkit reinvent government, or will it instead go 
the way of Sunnyvale? To be sure, one can see in the current algorithmic 
moment some of the same overconfidence, techno-utopianism, and internal 
capacity-building challenges that felled the “reinventing” movement. But the 
analogy is also useful because it brings into stark relief the very different 
stakes, and the very different political context, of the current algorithmic 
moment. The new algorithmic governance tools are not limited to internal 
performance metrics. Rather, they will increasingly displace administrative 
discretion at the core of the redistributive and coercive power of the state. And 
they will do so against the backdrop of a political zeitgeist, fueled by a 
pronounced anti-government, populist sentiment, that is far more challenging 
than the calls for a more efficient and streamlined government that powered the 
1990s-era “reinventing” effort. 
The stakes are high. Managed well, algorithmic governance tools can 
modernize public administration, promoting more efficient, accurate, and 
equitable forms of state action. Managed poorly, government deployment of AI 
tools can confirm views about inefficient and arbitrary government, hollow out 
the human expertise inside public bureaucracies with few compensating gains, 
and widen, rather than narrow, the public-private technology gap. Given these 
stakes, policymakers, agency administrators, judges, lawyers, and technologists 
should think hard, and concretely, about how to spur, not stymie, government 
adoption of AI tools while building appropriate accountability mechanisms 
around their use. Unless administrative law develops a coherent doctrinal and 
institutional approach to the governance of agency use of AI, its promise may 
prove as unrealized as President Clinton’s promise to reinvent government 
some twenty-five years ago. 
 
